

**Globalized Party-based Democracy and Africa:  
The Influence of Global Party-based Democracy  
Networks**

**M. A. Mohamed Salih**

**CSGR Working Paper No. 173/05**

**August 2005**

## **Globalized Party-based Democracy and Africa: The Influence of Global Party-based Democracy Networks**

M. A. Mohamed Salih  
CSGR Working Paper No 173/05  
August 2005

### *Abstract*

In this paper, I intend to explain what we mean by globalized party-based democracy in an African context.<sup>1</sup> The paper treats globalized party-based democracy as an extension of African colonial and imperial legacy and probes questions on the influence of today's global party-based democracy networks on African political parties. Specifically, I compare the accession of the major political parties in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi to global party-based democracy networks, and their influence on their ideologies and policy orientations in an era of neo-liberal globalisation.

If some aspects of African party-based democracy have globalized, the next question is what aspects have not (been) globalized. Paradoxically, despite a myriad of global influences, party-based democracies in Africa have retained much of their nascent quasi-polyarchy traits characterised by ethnic, religious and regional divisions, political patronage and weak internal party democracy. This prospect negates the idea that African political parties, indeed African political institutions, are under threat of being "universalised" as consequence of the ascendancy of globalized party-based democracy.

Keywords : Political party development, democratic transition, quasi-polyarchy, global party-to-party networks, party-based democracy, neo-liberal globalization, economic policy reforms.

Address for Correspondence:

Mohamed A. Salih,  
Professor of Politics of Development,  
Department of Political Science,  
University of Leiden  
&  
Institute of Social Studies,  
P.O.Box 29976,  
2502 LT The Hague,  
The Netherlands

E-mails: [Salih@iss.nl](mailto:Salih@iss.nl) & [Salih@fsw.leidenuniv.nl](mailto:Salih@fsw.leidenuniv.nl)

## **INTRODUCTION**

African political parties emerged in the non-democratic setting of colonial rule. A reformed post-Second World War colonial state sought to include Africans in the administration of their affairs. It had also created a pool of educated political elite experienced in operating Western style political institutions. Africans were allowed, under strict political surveillance, to establish political parties in order to oversee the machinery of government when their countries attained independence.

In the urge to leave behind political institutions similar to those of the west, the departing colonial governments decided to export to Africa their peculiar version of parliamentary government, with several competing political parties and recognised opposition. In practice, due to the speed with which this political development occurred, numerous ethnically-based parties emerged. Indeed they were encouraged by the colonial rule, because ethnic groups offered the most organised groups that were instantly available for political party formation.<sup>2</sup> However, ethnic divisions were minimised by the flare of synthetic nationalism, that although pitched opposing political parties against each other, remained focused on attaining the cherished goal of independence.

Political parties were established, assumed the structures and functions of Western-styled political parties and in the majority of countries, managed to see their countries through independence and self-rule. In some countries, it took the emergent African political elite less than a decade from establishing political parties to contesting elections and assuming the role of governing their countries.<sup>3</sup>

By-and-large, the political elite consumed the goal of national unity, which gave birth to their political ambitions. After independence, the elite fell back to sub-nationalist and ethnic politics within less than a decade of the attainment of independence and the waning of the short-lived excitement for decolonised nationalism.<sup>4</sup>

Fuelled by the Cold War and internal divisions, party-based democracy was the first victim of the political excesses of the ruling elite. In some countries, it fomented the rise of sub-nationalism and with it civil wars, liberation movements and political instability.<sup>5</sup> Regression to military rule, military socialism and different forms of authoritarian regimes was also a great obstacle to party-based democracy. In most cases, the authoritarian regimes banned all

political parties, curbed trade union and civic associations' activities and created constitutional one-party states.

The colonialists viewed political parties as hostile, despite the fact that some political parties had joined alliances with colonial rule, while the constituent assemblies were considered an extension of colonial rule.<sup>6</sup> To that extent, the constituent assemblies had restricted powers, often over-ruled by the Governor General and were allowed to debate only those issues that would pose no security threat to the colonial state. For instance, in most British colonies, Africans represented only a fraction of the members of the constituent assemblies, which were also members of the Empire Parliamentary Association.<sup>7</sup>

To be sure, African party-based democracy was born in the embryo of the colonial state coloured with a distinct hybrid of African political culture and western political thought. This development meant that the emergent political parties on the one hand championed independence and were considered hostile to colonial rule, and on the other adopted the dominant Western party-based democracy and its ideological modicum of the time.

There are at least two implications of the colonial origins of African party-based democracy: 1) the colonial era has sown the seeds of globalized party-based democracy, even before the emergence of the current wave of globalisation. It is therefore relevant to the contention that developing countries' globalized political institutions have their antecedence in the colonial and imperial expansions; and 2) the current consequences of neo-liberal globalisation on national political institutions, in particular political parties, do not represent a rupture in political party development. It combines the twin processes of continuity and change informed by the new global context of political development.

Until the early 1990s, most African political parties subscribed to one of two dominant global ideological trends: Socialism/communism or vaguely defined "liberal democratic" forms of government. Admittedly, there were only a few African party-based democracies, as two-thirds of the continent was for a time under the rule of authoritarian one-party states, military socialism or military dictatorships.

With the end of the Cold War, however, party-based democracy acquired prominence at the global level, where multi-partyism became synonymous with democracy. In the case of

Africa, the resurgence of multi-party democracy during the 1990s was a result of the triumph of the neo-liberal paradigm over various forms of authoritarianism. During this period, “institutionalism” became the dominant force informing economic and political liberalisation. International finance institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) preaching the primacy of “institutionalism”: The market and New Policy Management (NPM), in the case of economic governance, and the rule of law and good governance in case of political institutions.<sup>8</sup>

If economic globalisation has become synonymous with economic liberalisation and free trade and market principles, then political liberalisation has become synonymous with democratisation, often projected as the prevalence of multi-party democracy, hence party-based democracy. Globalized party-based democracy in Africa, therefore, cannot be isolated from these global developments and influences that have shaped its structure and policy orientations.

In particular, political liberalisation has invoked a series of political reform programmes, which in most countries included constitutional reforms to allow the formation of political parties and civic associations. This development has opened up the political space for electoral competition and the reform of statutory, penal and administrative structures that had once impeded any political activities outside the confines of the ruling political party, thus lifting the ban or legalizing the formation of political parties. These political, legal and administrative reforms extended civil liberties previously curbed under authoritarian one-party regimes, thus allowing the emergence of autonomous civil society and non-governmental organisations.

In this respect, we could attribute three major developments in African party-based democracy to neo-liberal globalisation:

- 1) the adoption or reconciliation of major party policy orientations with the neo-liberal globalisation paradigm;
- 2) the emergence of new political parties and civil society movements created by new political activists not part of or emerging out of the old political establishment; and
- 3) the integration of African political parties into global party-based democracy networks.

These three developments guide the discussion on whether African parties have been able to acquire both the form and content of a globalized party-based democracy.

Instead of asking how globalisation has contributed to the emergence of globalized party-based democracy, this paper explores how political parties in three African countries - Ghana, Kenya and Malawi – have reacted to neo-liberal globalisation. In particular, how they translated their party manifestos into policy orientations informed by or subservient to the neo-liberal global paradigm.

This approach is important for a number of reasons:

- i) It helps us study concrete political party principles, policies and practice vis-à-vis globalisation, instead of just speculating about how globalisation might or might not affect their ideological orientation and structures.
- ii) It underscores variation in political party responses in lieu of the economic and political factors that informed their reaction to globalized party-based democracy. Analysing African globalized party-based democracy from this perspective offers safeguards against crude generalisation.
- iii) It also helps us pose the question as to what aspects of African party-based democracy have not (been) globalized.

These aspects of globalized party-based democracy in Africa are explored below with specific reference to post-1990s transition to multi-party democracy using the cases of Ghana, Kenya and Malawi for illustration.

### **WHAT IS GLOBALIZED ABOUT AFRICA PARTY-BASED DEMOCRACIES?**

The question, what globalized party-based democracy means is yet to be answered in a systematic manner. This section does not pretend to answer this complex question in its entirety. It seeks to identify and explain three parameters that are characteristic of an emergent globalized party-based democracy in Africa. These are as follows:

- a) An emergent globally informed quasi-polyarchy where political parties subscribe to broadly defined party-based democratic principles;
- b) Except for a few, political party policies and programmes are largely influenced by the economic and social policy agenda also part of the dominant neo-liberal global paradigm; and
- c) African political parties have integrated into global party-democracy networks that in turn influenced and contributed to their partnership in joint activities and exchange of experiences.

These three parameters are elaborated in turn;

### **An emergent globally-informed quasi-polyarchy<sup>9</sup>**

Polyarchy refers to regimes that have been substantially popularised and liberalised, are highly inclusive and open extensively to public contestation.<sup>10</sup> A near-polyarchy can be relatively inclusive but with greater restrictions on public contestation than full polyarchy, or it might provide opportunities for public contestation comparable to those of a full polyarchy but somewhat less inclusive.<sup>11</sup> In this sense, most democratic regimes that allow to some degree for the challenge of power by the public are, in fact, quasi-polyarchy denotes democracies that fell short of the ideals of democracy.

The reference to quasi-polyarchy in the African context is significant not only because it recognises that there are various degrees of adherence to the democratic ideals accepted as characteristics of global party-based democracy, but also because it highlights two main possibilities. First, that polyarchy is a welcome development in countries where it signifies a move away from hegemonic regimes. Second, that in countries without recent experience with competitive politics, the transformation of hegemonic regimes into polyarchy is likely to remain a slow process, measured in generations.<sup>12</sup>

The relevance of this to Africa and developing countries in general is that their democracies are most likely to exhibit characteristics unique to their political culture. It alerts us to the grim possibility that securing any success by reproducing and exporting blueprints of western democracies is unrealistic and hardly practicable.

Without exception and both in terms of policy orientations and to large extent in practice, African political parties in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi have subscribed to the overall ethos of polyarchy. These characteristics inform their political party programmes, policies and manifestos. These are; “freedom to form and join organisations; freedom of expression; right to vote; eligibility for public office; right of political leaders to compete for support; right of political leaders to compete for votes; alternative sources of information; free and fair elections; and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.”<sup>13</sup>

However, because the political parties and the governments they form are far from fulfilling all the requirements of polyarchy, they lean towards quasi-polyarchy. Generally, they have accepted to operate under the rules-game laid down and conditionalities imposed by the global governance.

African opposition political parties, noting that governments do not often abide by the democratic rule, demand full compliance with the ethos of polyarchy. Unfortunately, once in government, opposition parties, also in common with most democracies in the world, revert to quasi-polyarchical and at times non-democratic tendencies. While it is very easy for opposition political parties to preach bold and rhetorical questions, once in power, they find themselves constrained by a completely different policy environment – one where they have to respond to increasing demands with the meagre resources of underdeveloped economies.

African political parties adhere to quasi-polyarchy not only due to external pressures exerted by global governance, democracy and human rights activists, but also for their own sake. Polyarchy is a safeguard against dictatorship and the return to authoritarian rule. Its ethos opens up the political space for competitive politics, which in turn offer the possibility of competing in elections and even governing should they become the majority party in parliament. Little wonder that globalized party-based democracy in Africa is largely quasi-polyarchy, which is the dominant feature of the majority of democracies worldwide.

### **Globally influenced political party programmes**

African political parties, with the exception of a few socialist or Marxist oriented parties, have embraced the major tenets of “liberal democracy” reflected in their political party

programmes, manifestos, charters and their new or reformed constitutions. The principles of free contestation and participation in the political process meant that the need for “liberalizing” the political space was:

- (a) a factor of popular and civil society agitation against decades of dictatorship;
- (b) a requirement demanded by political parties banned for decades from participating in politics or newly formed political parties offering themselves as alternatives to the single ruling political party; and
- (c) global governance, democracy and human rights activism, bilateral or multi-lateral donor conditionality and global economic governance under the influence and insistence of IMF and World Bank on instilling the ethos of good or better governance and political liberalisation on a global scale.

These developments have shaped the political programmes and policies of the major political parties across Africa. Below I explain how neo-liberal global economic and social policy orientations have influenced the post 1990s reforms and the political parties’ response.

Table (1) shows the composition of political parties in the parliament of Ghana since the commencement of the Fourth Republic in 1993.<sup>14</sup> The distribution of votes illustrates the presence of strong competition between Rawling’s National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) by which Ghana is evidently a two-party state.

Since the 1993 elections, parliamentary discussions and political elite debate has been over how their political parties could respond more adequately to the economic policy reforms subscribed by the global finance institutions (World Bank and IMF). There were no dissenting voices within the ranks of the two dominant political parties regarding abandoning the economic policy reforms or suggesting alternative policies to those proposed by the international finance institutions.<sup>15</sup> In this regard, NDC was the champion of Ghana’s policy reforms, particularly, the special place that it earned in the global finance institutions for rigorously implementing the economic reform policy. Ghana was successful in managing the Economic Recovery Programmes (ERP) started in 1983—stabilising the economy through IMF/World Bank economic liberalisation policies.<sup>16</sup>

However, with the economic slow down early last decade, NPP, which formed the backbone of the opposition, gained popular support, accusing the NDC of corruption and inability to implement the economic reform agenda diligently. NPP is pursuing an economic policy traditionally associated with the NDC and, perhaps, succeeding where NDC failed.

Table 1: *Political parties represented in parliaments, Ghana (1993-)*

| Political party                         | 1993       |              | 1997       |              | 2001       |              | 2004       |              |
|-----------------------------------------|------------|--------------|------------|--------------|------------|--------------|------------|--------------|
|                                         | Seats      | %            | Seat       | %            | Seats      | %            | Seats      | %            |
| National Democratic Congress (NDC)      | 189        | 94.5         | 133        | 66.5         | 92         | 45.0         | 94         | 40.86        |
| New Patriotic Party (NPP)               | -          |              | 61         | 30.5         | 100        | 50.0         | 128        | 55.65        |
| <b>Grand Coalition</b>                  |            |              |            |              |            |              |            |              |
| * National Convention Party (NCP)       | 8          | 4.0          | -          |              | -          |              | -          |              |
| Peoples National Convention (PNC)       | -          |              | 1          | 0.5          | 3          | 1.5          | 4          | 1.73         |
| Convention Peoples Party (CPP)          | -          | -            | -          | -            | 1          | 0.5          | 3          | 1.30         |
| Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere (EGLE) | 1          | 0.5          | -          |              | -          |              | -          |              |
| *PCP                                    | -          |              | 5          | 2.5          | -          |              | -          |              |
| Independent                             | 2          | 1.0          | -          |              | 4          | 2.0          | 1          | 0.43         |
| <b>Total</b>                            | <b>200</b> | <b>100.0</b> | <b>200</b> | <b>100.0</b> | <b>200</b> | <b>100.0</b> | <b>230</b> | <b>99.97</b> |

**Source:** National Electoral Commission (NEC) of Ghana, "Election Results," published in 1993, 1997, 2001 and 2004, respectively, Accra, Ghana.

Because there is no radically alternative political party policy that could pose serious challenge to the general direction of Ghana's economic policy reform, human rights and the rule of law became the key arena of policy differences and political contestation. In respect to the global social issues involved, the NDC stresses the primacy of food, shelter, clothing, education and stability as the cornerstone of its human rights policy in its Manifesto, owing to its socialist ideological orientation.<sup>18</sup>

While NPP Manifesto places emphasis on the enjoyment of human rights to their full and respect for the rule of law, NDC places emphasis on social justice. The war of visions between "fundamental human rights" and the "social justice", common to the global debate between liberals and social democrats, was important for NPP. The abysmal human rights record of NDC's and its association with Rawling's Military Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government (1981-1992) justifies the NPP counter-critique.

Unlike Ghana, which has undergone two unrestricted multi-party elections where NPP ousted the incumbent political party (NDC) from power by NPP, Kenya has undergone only one unrestricted multi-party election since independence - in December 1963. The electoral

victory of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in the 2002 elections, after a bitter struggle by national and global democracy and human rights activists, ended 40 years of Kenya African National Union's (KANU) one party rule. Table (2) shows the results of the three multi-party elections during the post-political reform period. The elections of 1992 and 1997 were fraudulent, and that of 2002 was relatively free and fair.

Table 2: *Political Parties Represented in Bunge, Kenya (1992-)*

|     | Political party                                        | 1992                       |               | 1997                        |              | 2002                        |              |
|-----|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------|--------------|-----------------------------|--------------|
|     |                                                        | Seats                      | %             | Seats                       | %            | Seats                       | %            |
| 1.  | Kenya African National Union (KANU)                    | 100<br>(112)               | 56.00         | 107<br>(113)                | 50.09        | 64 (68)                     | 30.63        |
| 2.  | <b>National Rainbow coalition (NARC)</b>               | -                          | -             | -                           | -            | 125<br>(132)                | 59.45        |
| 3.  | Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)                         | -                          | -             | -                           | -            | **                          |              |
| 4.  | Democratic Party (DP) (39+)                            | 23                         | 11.50         | 39(41)                      | 18.46        | **                          | **           |
| 5.  | Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (FORD-K)  | 31                         | 15.50         | 17(18)                      | 8.11         | **                          | **           |
| 6.  | National Party of Kenya (NPK)                          | -                          | -             | -                           | -            | **                          | **           |
| 7.  | Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-People (FORD P) | -                          | -             | 3                           | 1.35         | 14(15)                      | 6.75         |
| 8.  | National Development Party (NDP)                       |                            |               | 21(22)                      | 9.90         |                             |              |
| 9.  | Sisi Kwa Sisi (SKS)                                    |                            |               |                             |              | 2                           | 0.90         |
| 10. | Safina (SAFINA)                                        |                            |               | 5(6)                        | 2.70         | 2                           | 0.90         |
| 11. | Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Asili (Ford-A)  | 31                         | 15.50         | 1                           | 0.45         | 2                           | 0.90         |
| 12. | Social Democratic Party (SDP)                          | -                          | -             | 15 (16)                     | 7.20         | -                           | -            |
| 13. | Kenya Social Congress (KSC)                            | 1                          | 0.50          | 1                           | 0.45         | -                           | -            |
| 14. | Kenya National Congress (KNC)                          | 1                          | 0.50          | -                           | -            | -                           | -            |
| 15. | Party of Independent Candidates of Kenya (PICK)        | 1                          | 0.50          | -                           | --           | -                           | -            |
| 16. | Shirikisho Party of Kenya (Shirikisho)                 | -                          | -             | 1                           | 0.45         | 1                           | 0.45         |
|     | <b>Total</b>                                           | <b>180</b><br><b>(200)</b> | <b>100.00</b> | <b>210</b><br><b>(222)*</b> | <b>99.97</b> | <b>210</b><br><b>(222)*</b> | <b>99.93</b> |

\* 210 elected; 12 appointed, totalling 222 seats.

\*\* Included in NARC parliamentary group

**Source:** Election Commission of Kenya (ECK), Parliamentary Election Result Reports for 1992, 1997 and 2002, Nairobi.

However, NARC's election pledge was centred on pursuing different and sound economic policies from those of KANU, reviving the economy and implementing the IMF and World Bank policies, in effect, subscribing more fully to the economic agenda of the international financial institutions.<sup>21</sup> Although NARC, a coalition of 14 large and small political parties with different ideological and policy orientations, continued the economic policy reforms initiated during the closing years of KANU supremacy, the World Bank and IMF supported economic liberalisation reforms including the removal of import licensing, price and foreign exchange controls.

In retrospect, the IMF and the World Bank suspension of aid to Kenya in early 2001 (due to the government's failure to implement the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programme, curb corruption and privatise key inefficient economic sectors), dealt KANU electoral hope a decisive blow. It created a sense of paralysis in the implementation of Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Programme and Economic and Public Sector Reform. In the same year, Kenya experienced a serious economic recession. Kenya Gross Domestic Product actually shrunk to 0.3 per cent, almost reminiscent of the negative growth rates of the mid 1990s.<sup>22</sup>

The continuing presence of high profile politicians from the era of President Arap Moi, including President Mwai Kibaki and several NARC dignitaries made little difference in terms of political culture (corruption) or acceptance to reduce the powers of the President vis-à-vis parliament in the new constitution. A vivid example is that even university professors such as Peter Anyang Nyong'o began to realise the difficulties of trying bring a marriage between the political lure and abysmal economic dividend of neo-liberal globalisation.

Mainstream political parties' malice contributed to the emergence of more radical leftist parties in Kenya than probably anywhere else in the continent, as people began to realise that there is little substance beneath the facade of electoral promises. Among the most prominent of Kenya's 16 leftist political parties are the following: Anti-capitalist Convergence of Kenya (ACCK), Poor Man's Liberation Front (PMLF) and Party of the Proletariat and Peasants. The two green parties (Green African Party and Mazingira Green Party) also have leftist leanings.

Three centre left parties are represented in NARC—the Labour Party of Kenya (LPK), Kenya National Democratic Alliance and Kenya Socialist Party (KSP).

Whereas global governance and international financial institutions could influence the programmes of large political parties or political parties that are poised to win elections and govern, smaller political parties can afford to be defiant and even radical. In the case of Kenya, the smaller political parties’ rhetoric seems to pay more dividend than realism. Radical rhetoric has therefore become the only discourse that distinguishes them from the governing political parties.

In common with Kenya and Ghana, Malawi’s transition to multi-party democracy came about as a result of popular struggles supported by the proactive solidarity of the global democracy networks and activists. President Kamuzu Banda, the chair of Malawi Congress Party (MCP) that governed the a one-party state for 30 years, accepted the 1993 referendum that rejected the continuation of single party rule and opted for multi-party democracy.<sup>23</sup> The first multi-party election took place in 1994 and MCP, the incumbent party, lost (see table 3).

Table 3: *Political Parties Represented in Malawi National Assembly (1994-)*

| Political party                        | 1994       |               | 1999       |              | 2004       |              |
|----------------------------------------|------------|---------------|------------|--------------|------------|--------------|
|                                        | seats      | %             | Seats      | %            | Seats      | %            |
| United Democratic Front (UDF)          | 84         | 47.45         | 93         | 48.34        | 49         | 25.40        |
| Malawi Congress Party (MCP)            | 55         | 31.10         | 66         | 34.36        | 56         | 29.00        |
| Alliance for Democracy (AFORD)         | 36         | 20.33         | 29         | 15.10        | 6          | 3.10         |
| Congress for National Unity (CONU)     | -          | -             | -          | -            | 1          | 0.50         |
| People Transformation Party (PETRA)    | -          | -             | -          | -            | 1          | 0.50         |
| Peoples Progressive Movement (PPM)     | -          | -             | -          | -            | 6          | 3.10         |
| Movement for Genuine Democracy (MGODE) | -          | -             | -          | -            | 3          | 1.60         |
| National Democratic Alliance (NDA)     | -          | -             | -          | -            | 8          | 4.10         |
| Republican Party (RP)                  | -          | -             | -          | -            | 15         | 7.80         |
| Undecided                              | 2          | 1.12          | -          | -            | 6          | 3.10         |
| Independents                           | -          | -             | 4          | 2.08         | 39         | 20.20        |
| <b>Total</b>                           | <b>177</b> | <b>100.00</b> | <b>192</b> | <b>99.88</b> | <b>193</b> | <b>98.40</b> |

Source: Malawi Election Committee (MEC), “Parliamentary Election Result Reports,” 1994, 1999 and 2004,

The political programmes and manifestos of Malawi major political parties and coalitions, which formed the three governments since the first multi-party elections, responded to national issues informed by the dominant neo-liberal paradigm. The manifestos of Malawi's political parties are almost identical to those pronounced by governing and opposition political parties in Ghana and Kenya. Wilfred Sumani (2004) succinctly described the similarity of Malawi political party programmes. He purports that, the convergence of visions would make policy-making processes easier and more sustainable, than in a situation where different parties have fundamental differences such as being for or against homosexual marriages, abortion, capital punishment, socialism's regimental economic system or capitalism's laissez-faire worldview.<sup>25</sup>

In fact, all the issues Sumani mentions are identical to those currently occupying large space in the political debate in various part of the world and in particular the USA and Europe. These issues offer an added emphasis on the globalized nature of party-based democracies' political programmes and policy orientations.

For example, political party manifestos are almost identical dealing with issues such free trade, privatisation, public sector reforms, democracy and the rule of law, good governance (often dubbed as anti-corruption strategies), economic policy reforms, poverty reduction strategies, sustainable development, gender auditing among others.<sup>26</sup> However, aware of the global context within which they operate, post-political reform governments were able to implement national socio-economic policies carefully designed to gauge public support and improve their electability.<sup>27</sup> Equally, they have mostly maintained a balancing act and adopt a minimalist approach to neo-liberal economic policy reforms and meet their obligations to donors and international finance institutions.

What is important here is not that political parties act on their electoral pledges and manifestos. African political parties are not different from political parties in most parts of the world: they do not fully implement all the electoral pledges they make in their election manifestos. However, what is important is that election pledges and party manifestos inform the conduct of government. It is therefore safe to argue that the political parties operated under conditions of abject poverty, high hopes and very limited resources, which often stifle their good intentions to act on their promises.

## **Integration of African political parties into global parliamentary and party-based democracy networks**

This section explains the integration of the political parties in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi into global-party democracy networks. Ideologically like-minded global party networks not only maintain solidarity, but also strategize and lend democracy assistance to foster the ethos of global party-to-party cooperation and networks. Whether these global party-based democracy networks affect the conduct of African democracies is a complex question that this paper will not be able to answer in totality. However, it is possible to draw some ideas about the potential consequences of global party-based democracy networks activities for future development of African party-based democracy development.

In the following sub-section, I divide global democracy networks into two types of networks: parliamentary and party-to-party networks. Both are member-paying networks different from the international democracy assistance institutions that are generally fraternal.<sup>29</sup> Global party-to-party networks espouse direct relationships with their partner institutions and are open only to those political parties that share similar ideological orientation. However, recent trends show that international democracy assistance institutions encourage all-party programmes in order to foster cooperation and mute hostile rivalry among political parties and politicians.

### *Global parliamentary democracy networks:*

The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) is by far the oldest global parliamentary lobby network in the World.<sup>30</sup> Established in 1889, during the highest of colonial expansion, as the International Organisation of Parliaments of Sovereign States, today 140 parliaments are members of IPU. It is made-up of six geopolitical groups (Africa, Asia-Pacific, Arab, Eurasia, Latin America and 12-Plus Group i.e. Western and Eastern European countries). Its office at the United Nations is also active in providing parliamentary hearings and organizes international events.

Although some members of IPU do not adhere to liberal democracy (China, Cuba and Cambodia), in 1997, it adopted the *Universal Declaration on Democracy*.<sup>31</sup> The activities it organizes in support of the democratic process once it is unleashed, without being actively

engaged in fomenting agitations for democracy, reflect its adherence to the Universal declaration of democracy.

The IPU Africa group consists of 39 members, with the absence of Chad, Eritrea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Somalia and Swaziland. The parliaments of Kenya and Ghana are active members of IPU, currently represented by parliamentarians from the governing political parties in Ghana, Kenya and Ghana.

The IPU organises Pan-African, and sub-regional symposia and on subjects such as representative democracy, international peace and security, sustainable development, human rights, education, science and culture and women in parliament. The stated objective of these is to aid democracy and improve the quality of governance as well as enhance worldwide parliamentary dialogue and peace through the establishment of representative democracy.

Of particular relevance to Ghana, Kenya and Malawi is the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA),<sup>32</sup> which is by far, the second oldest global democracy network. Established in 1911 as the Empire Parliamentary Association, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association's (CPA) members consist of 170 national, state, provincial and territorial parliaments, with about 15,000 Parliamentarians.

The CPA mission is to advance parliamentary democracy, enhance knowledge and understanding of democratic governance, and build an informed parliamentary community able to deepen the Commonwealth democratic commitment and further cooperation among its parliaments and legislatures.

There is a distinct African group within the Commonwealth called Pan-African Commonwealth Parliamentary Group which cooperates with the Pan-African Parliament.<sup>33</sup> The governing political parties in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi are members. Generally, the new global context of development influences the activities of global parliamentary networks. Although parliamentary networks are mainly interested in improving the capabilities of parliamentarians and the capacity of parliaments, their activities also influence political parties. This is not only because parliamentarians represent political parties and the electorates who voted for them, but also because the strong presence of parties constituting

the governing majority has strong bearing on government policy and programmes as well as adherence to democratic principles.<sup>34</sup>

By their historical antecedence and current functions, global parliamentary networks represent an element of continuity from colonialism and imperialism into the current developments of the globalizing world in which they operate. Therefore, they have to cope with this dual heritage and the new opportunities it offers as part of the global governance regime.

#### *Global party-to-party partnerships and networks*

The accession of African political parties to global-party-to-party networks is a new phenomenon dating back less than two decades. It is a product of the end of the Cold War and the ideological schism between East and West, post 1990s transition to democracy and the opening up of the political space for proactive transnational political, economic and social networks. The subsequent evolution and maturation of these networks has signalled the end of the state monopoly of inter-state relations and the emergence of non-state actors such as civil society and non-governmental organizations and political party networks. So in this subsection, we trace the integration of the major Ghanaian, Kenyan and Malawian political parties in these networks and their policy influences.

African Christian Democrats Union (ACDU) is part of the International Christian Democrats Union (ICDU) - an association that consists of Conservative, Christian Democrats or what they call like-minded political parties of the centre and centre-right. ACDU activities are attended by parliamentarians representing their political parties or the youth troikas of the member parties, for example, Ghana is represented by the New Patriotic Party's (NPP) Youth Wing (NPPY) and Ghana Liberal Students Association (GHALSA), Malawi by Malawi Congress Party (MCP), United Democratic Front Youth (UDFY) and Kenya Democratic Party (DP). The youth element is particularly significant for recruitment, internalizing democratic values and preparing the next generation of democrats.

In August 1997, eleven African liberal youth organisations founded the Dakar-based Democrat Union of Africa/African Dialogue Group (DUA/ADG) as part of the International Democrats Union (IDU). IDU member parties organized in regional networks most of which came to existence as new democracies established during the 1990s.<sup>35</sup> DUA/ADG provides a

forum for parties with similar convictions to come to meet and exchange views and experiences on matters of policy and organisation, so that they can learn from each other, act together and establish contacts. More importantly, they agree on common positions to influence the direction of global policies once they are in power and speak with one voice to promote democracy and centre-right policies around the globe.

New Patriotic Party (NPP) of Ghana; Democratic Party (DP) of Kenya; and Congress Party (MCP), of Malawi are members of IDU. While NPP and MPC are the main opposition parties in Ghana and Malawi, respectively, the Democratic Party of Kenya is a member of the governing National Rainbow Coalition. This also shows that parties that share similar convictions have the opportunity to meet and exchange ideas regardless of whether or not they are in government.

Socialist International is a worldwide organisation of social democratic, socialist and labour parties. Currently, it brings together 162 political parties and organisations from all continents. Twenty-three African political parties are Socialist International members (19 full members and 4 observers). The opposition, National Democratic Congress (NDC), is the only Ghanaian political party represented in Socialist International. Although Kenya has more leftist political parties than any other African country, none of its socialist or leftist parties are members of Socialist International.

Apparently, the association of Socialist International with the socialist political parties of the Cold War era still haunts many socialist-oriented African political parties fearful of being associated with the military socialism of the past. Nevertheless, once in power, they subscribe to the neo-liberal agenda and therefore exhibit little if any policy differences from their political opponents.<sup>36</sup>

The Green Party Federation of Africa is a member of the Global Green Federation, which consists of 800 green parties worldwide. There are 15 African Green Party members including the Mazingira Green Party of Kenya. The general principles that bring Greens together include economical wisdom, social justice, participatory democracy, sustainability and respect for diversity and non-violence.<sup>37</sup>

Although the African Greens are yet to exert significant influence on African polity, they attract considerable solidarity with the global green movement and its ecological campaigns against oil, mineral and industrial pollution, rainforest logging and the protection of biodiversity.<sup>38</sup> However, support in African environmental struggles is yet to translate into parliamentary seats in any of the three sample countries.

Liberal International (LI) is an association of parties, groups, cooperating organisations and individuals that support and accept the liberal principles aimed at fostering the growth of a democratic society based on personal liberty, personal responsibility and social justice. LI provides financial and human resources for cooperation and interchange of information between member organisations and men and women of all countries who accept these principles.

United Democratic Front (UDF) of Malawi is a member of Liberal International, as well as a member of the London-based African Liberal Network (ALN) established in 2003 by 17 African liberal political parties. It is paradoxical that although the policies adopted by most African governing political parties have a neo-liberal orientation, they do not declare themselves liberal, out of fear of their opponents' critique. But UDF openly declares its adoption of liberal international principles, without which Liberal International will not accept its membership of this globalized party-based democracy network.<sup>39</sup>

Arguably, Africa's political party integration in global parliamentary and party-to-party networks illustrate that a third generation African party-based democracies (the first being the colonial and the second being a mix of one-party systems and restricted democracies of the 1990s) have emerged. This generation is more confident and open to global party-to-party networks influences and the globalized democratic values they propagate.

At least two scenarios are possible: 1) global parliamentary associations and political party networks, initiated by mature democracies influence party-based democracy in Africa by persuasion, training and exchange of strategy and policy. The ultimate outcome of these networks and interactions is creating a global space for better dispensation of democratic values. A counter argument is that 2) the continuing presence of powerful global democratic trends and values would deprive Africans the opportunity to devise paths to democracy independent of global influences.

The major contribution of global democracy networks, in my view, is the incarnation of a gentler political modernization agenda under the guise of modernisation revisionism and a dominant neo-liberal paradigm.<sup>40</sup> Another outcome of externally-driven globalized party-based democracy is the widening of the gulf between elite-dominated political institutions such as political parties and parliaments on the one side, and on the other the masses of the illiterate African citizens who would feel increasingly alienated by the conduct of the political elite. The ultimate result of such scenario is political apathy and withdrawal.

### **WHAT HAS NOT GLOBALIZED IN AFRICAN PARTY-BASED DEMOCRACIES?**

The dialectical ‘other’ of what is globalized is what is not globalized about African party-based democracy. This section deals with three aspects of African party-based democracy that have not (been) globalized: the ethnic nature of political parties, the persistence of up-scaled patron-client networks, and the absence of internal party democracy. Each is discussed in turn.

#### **The ethnic nature of African political parties**

Generally, African political parties remain ethnic in nature, created, organised and dominated by an educated elite, and as modern political institutions, the elite exploit them to contest elections and maintain control over the personnel and the policy of government. Ethnic political parties are instruments for actualizing political elite interests often mistaken for the interests of their ethnic group or region. Two characteristics are common to the majority of African party-based democracies, as far as the political parties are concerned:

First, African political parties tend to be elitist, based on non-democratic structures and organisation, with irregular contacts with their electoral base. Contacts among party committee members are superficial due to the leadership’s control over party management. The educational gap between party leadership and functionaries also inflicts limitations on the party members to voice concerns or to take their concerns seriously when they voiced. Political contacts with the electorates are periodic with the highest level of intensity during election campaigns.

Second, the majority of party members are politically illiterate (i.e. not aware of the ideological bases on which modern political parties are founded as liberal, social democratic or republican) and lack experience of how democratic institutions operate. In the circumstances, ethnicity provides a strong ideological foundation based on an ethnic system of belief, political values and culture.

If political parties are institutional mechanisms for capturing and maintaining power, then elections are the institutional mechanism through which political parties compete for power. Elections are rightful political activities in which citizens exercise their sovereign will in selecting their representatives, who eventually form or select the personnel and policy of government. Furthermore, elections facilitate the orderly transfer of power according to the will of a sovereign citizenry. Political parties that are ethnic inclined or ethnic in orientation, currently assume party-based democracy functions, with varying degrees of success.

Although this has been well documented elsewhere, I observed that the influence of ethnicity in the political parties of the three countries under consideration has actually become more apparent with the onset of democratic rule, as ethnic groups sought to protect their interests through specific political parties in the region which they consider capable of giving them protection and security.<sup>41</sup> Table 5 shows the strong association of political parties with region and ethnicity in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi:

Table 4: *Ethnic Character and voting behaviour of major political parties in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi*

| <b>Country</b> | <b>Major political party, coalition or elite pacts</b> | <b>Ethnic or regional support</b>                                                                                                                          |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Ghana          | New Patriotic Party (NPP)                              | Largely Ashanti, AQuapem and Fante, also won votes in some NDC stronghold in the North.                                                                    |
|                | National Democratic Congress (NDC)                     | Akan/Ewe, Ga-Adangbe also gained support from a variety of smaller ethnic groups.                                                                          |
| Kenya          | National Rainbow Coalition (NARC)                      | Substantial support from the Lou ethnic group. Lou educated political elite form the majority of ministers in NARC Government, including President Kibaki. |

|        |                                                        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|        | Kenya African National Union (KANU)                    | Alliance of small ethnic groups with substantial Kikuyu support for Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Jomo Kenyatta (the first President of independent Kenya) a failed Presidential candidate in 2002 elections.         |
|        | Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-People (FORD-P) | The only strong remaining fraction of FORD 1992 which was created by Oginga Odinga (Lou and various ethnic groups from Nyasa, Central, Western and Rift Valley Provinces)                                      |
| Malawi | United Democratic Front (UDF)                          | Southern region (Yao), with MCP encroachment in some constituencies (Chewa).                                                                                                                                   |
|        | Malawi Congress Party (MCP)                            | Central and adjacent Northern region: mainly, Chewa, Nyanja, Tumbuko, Yao, Lomwe, Sena, Tonga, Ngoni, Ngonde                                                                                                   |
|        | Republican Party (RP)                                  | Dominant in Northern and Southern Region (Yao and mainly Tumbuko ethnic groups), gained votes from some ethnic groups in the North loyal to MCP and AFORD. Also encroached in UDF constituencies in the South. |
|        | Alliance for Democracy (AFORD)                         | Northern region: Tumbuko, Tonga and Chakufwa ethnic groups, strong rivalry with MCP.                                                                                                                           |

Sources: The author compiled this table from various sources, in particular matching Constituency/District 2004 Election results and dominant ethnic groups.

For example, in Kenya, although the major trend suggests voting on ethnic lines, there are a few exceptions often influenced by the extent of linguistic and cultural similarities of the dominant ethnic groups. The same applies to Malawi's Northern, Central and Southern regions. UDF dominated in the South region and was able to encroach into MCP territory in the Central region. AFORD also shared Northern region votes with UDF. However, although the whole population identifies itself as northerners (or *wakumpoto*) in reality they belong to diverse ethnic groups, mainly Chakufwa, Chewa, Nyanja, Tumbuko, Yao, Lomwe, Sena, Tonga, Ngoni, Ngonde<sup>42</sup>. This case is not different from that of Ghana where NDC enjoys large support from Akan/Ewe and Ga-Adangbe support, but also gained support from a variety of smaller ethnic groups, while NPP was unassailable among the Ashante, Fante and Akuapem<sup>43</sup>

Interestingly, all presidential candidates during the last presidential elections in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi gained the majority of the votes in their ethnic group constituencies. The implications of this for the formation of government, distribution of ministerial positions and chairpersons of parliamentary committees are horrendous. This has contributed to a venomous critique of the governments of the respective presidents, highlighting charges of nepotism and corruption.

Despite the fact that it is a crude generalization to claim that all members of the same ethnic mentioned in the table vote only for one political party only, the table reveals that, despite their adherence to party-based democracy ethos as quasi-polyarchy, there is a clear affiliation of the dominant political allegiance to region and ethnicity. Because ethnic groups assume some permanence, the elites holding of power through their manipulation also assumes a sense of continuity of the political values enshrined in inter- and intra-ethnic politics. For the African electorates' ethnic groups, and not modern Western ideology, became the ideological markers for a leadership devoid of the concept of the circulation of the elite – something that is central to the idea of party-based democracy. This phenomenon has also negatively entrenched patronage and contributed to the poor record of internal democracy in Africa's political parties.

### **Patron client relationship**

An important feature where party-based democracy has not globalized is the strong presence of client-patron relations between party leadership and party operative. Political party tycoons and the oligarchies personal kick backs, or central government support to access local political gains or thwart (at times provoke) conflicts (such as the case of Kenya's Rift Valley Clashes between 1997 – 1999. In this sense, a client-patron relationship is fundamentally a relationship of exchange where the client in turn provides support for the patron. <sup>44</sup>

As if the troublesome presence of ethnic divisions is not sufficient complication for African democratization politics, Berman (1998) traced the linkages between ethnicity and patron-client networks to the colonial rule grounded in the latter alliance with local chiefs. According to Breman (Ibid. 305) “patron-client networks remain the fundamental state-society linkage in circumstances of social crisis and uncertainty and have extended to the very

centre of the state. This accounts for all personalistic, materialistic and opportunistic character of African politics”.<sup>45</sup>

Evidently, the politics of patronage does not remain at the state -society level and nor is it static. For example, Tangri (1999) shows that politics of patronage seeps also through the state-private sector relations as a facilitator of the access to resources and economic opportunities, even when the state responds to global policy designs such as privatisation.<sup>46</sup> The interplay of public and private enterprises and the shift of resources from the public to the private sector has also benefited from entrenched patronage relations, corruption and malpractices in favour of political allies and literally brethren, or in response to social pressures from modern business or political elite and ethnic patronage networks.

Globalisation has on the one hand, created transformed local leaders/chiefs and subjects’ patronage relations in the sense that chiefs are increasingly impoverished materially and in terms of power, and therefore unable to respond to the demands of modern politics. They increasingly play an intermediary role between the elite and the voters rather than commanding the main power resources. This intermediary role means that the chiefs and the local leaders use their proximity to society and deliver votes to the ethnic group presidential or parliamentary candidate in exchange for financial and other types of support.

Because patronage benefits the chiefs and just a few individuals within the ethnic groups, it is understandable that those left out consider it as a non-African.

To be sure, in the case of Kenya, which could be generalized for other parts of rural Africa, Kipkorir, laments;

Our country is built on the pillar of all the tribes, creating a beneficial symphony of cultural and linguistic diversity. However, our leaders have hijacked our tribal diversity for their own selfish ends. Every time leaders ‘steal’ from the country, they eat with their nuclear family, but when experience a fall-out, they make refuge in their tribes. What I have never understood is why Kenyans always rally around their own at that time, why we have never realised that tribes never steal or grab property. This is what makes us unique”.<sup>47</sup>

In a sense, this quotation is about the individualism brought about by the commoditization of the so-called economy of compassion and the prevalence of neo-liberal values in a globalized African polity.

A final commentary on this sub-section is that globalized party-based democracy has also brought along globalized forms of patronage, whereby political parties expect favours from transnational corporations during election campaigns.<sup>48</sup> In fact, the governing political parties also found themselves at the mercy of a semi-patronage relationship with the international financial institutions' capability to reward political parties that adhere to the economic reform agenda, and withdraw such support from 'non-compliant' governments – and subsequently the political parties that form them. As described here in the cases of Kenya and Ghana, the war of will between opposition and government and their respective competences to implement major economic and social reform policies, is also part of this globally operated new patronage arrangements.

In sum, globalized party-based democracy has moved traditional localized or state-based patronage networks closer to global patronage networks involving global actors, who exert their influence on political parties throughout Africa and in other parts of the developing world too. As Peter Burnell and Jan Art Scholte have separately argued, adaptation and variant forms of continuity, rather than schism or rupture, have shaped political party oscillation between localization and globalisation.<sup>49</sup> Both developments should in the process also influence our understanding of new and complex political party arrangements, which traverse local, national and regional boundaries and get involved in global parliamentary and party-to-party networks.

### **Internal party democracy**

Ethnic, regional or religious cleavage and patronage affect internal party democracy, as political parties become fiefdoms of their political leaders. Internal party democracy - defined in terms of how candidates are selected, the rules for leadership contests, regular membership conventions, and internal rules to discipline party leadership and hold it accountable to party members - is in short supply in all major

political parties in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi. Invariably, small core committee members decide party affairs and policy.

With a few exceptions, most party leaders use their privileged position to enrich themselves at the expense of the masses in whose name they contest elections and win parliamentary seats.<sup>50</sup> Mwakyembe (1994) reminds us African political parties are not democratic; they exclude ordinary, mostly uneducated people from the political process, are elitist and non-transparent.<sup>51</sup> In some cases, non-elected wealthy and powerful party members collude with the state to control the party, thus creating an executive with muted legislative or political checks and balances.

In all three cases, the leaders of the major political parties are products of and participated in a long period of one-party rule. They have defected, joined the democratic struggle or established their own political parties. Others were released from their ministerial duties by (or disagreed with) their former political mentors and joined the opposition.<sup>52</sup>

The financing of the political parties is dependent on the personal wealth of the leader at best, or the public coffers at worst, which helped them to organise election campaigns and lead a lavish lifestyle. In such circumstances, the party leader becomes the party boss with unquestioned authority over party committees, policies and decisions. However, Bertha Chiroro (2005: p.2) reminds us that:

In most parties an internal party democracy remains a challenge amidst the legacy of centralisation, which emanated from the liberation struggle. However, two developments are taking place in the region: i) the increased realisation that political parties are at the core of democratic governance. This has prompted the focus on the capacity building of political parties, which includes their funding, and creating an enabling environment for their existence. ii) The increased involvement of civil society organisations in the functioning of parties has led to the opening up of parties in the region to be able to participate more with Women's organisations labour unions, students, churches and other rural organisations to influence policies.<sup>53</sup>

In this regard, the institutionalization of internal party democracy in African is contingent on the maturation and ability of civic associations to influence them. In this it is important to realize that patron-client relationships and internal party democracy cannot be divorced from the political environment in which democracy is practiced.

At least three points could be teased out here. First, one way of looking at party-based democracy is that it acquires its meaning from global policy influences on the current wave of multi-party democracy and new global context within which political parties operate. In common with political parties elsewhere in the world, African political parties are aware of their position in the geopolitics of development, which characterises their political programmes and policy orientations.

Second, political party vocabulary, policy and party-electorate relations straddle the contours of similar but nationally different globally informed neo-liberal paradigms, without stifling the possibility of the emergence of vocal anti-globalisation political parties and civil society activism. This trend is not different from other parts of the world, where the challenges to the neo-liberal paradigm come from the very democratic forces that it has unleashed.

Third, globalized party-based democracy does not mean universalised party-based democracy - a point which has been emphasized as opening up the political for political contestation (Burnell 2004).<sup>54</sup> In other words, political parties' worldwide could subscribe to a range of broadly defined global paradigms as reflected in their political manifestos, such as the ones consulted by this writer. Evidently, there would always be points both of convergence and divergence on some elements of any globally informed socio-economic or political paradigm.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

African political parties exhibit some elements of globalized party-based democracy with features common to other examples of quasi-polyarchy around the world. The political manifestos, programmes and policy orientations adhere to the ethos of globalized party-based democracy in the sense that they are informed and subsequently influenced by their membership of a wide range of global networks and party-to-party networks.

However, African political parties also exhibit some elements of localised or national political culture, such as the absence of internal party democracy, persistent patronage arrangements and strong party affiliation with ethnicity, religion or region, which alerts us to the fact that African party-based democracy has generally retained the form and less so the content of Western party-based democracy.

Should the distinction between form and content persuade us to argue that the qualities of party-based democracies that do not conform to the content of Western democracies are in question? Is (or should) the notion ‘globalised party-based democracy’ (be) predicated on the prevalence of the dominant Western “liberal democratic” form, regardless of the actual quality of its democratic content? In responding to this question, I suggest that while the content of African party-based democracy leaves much to be desired, the political elite has used the form effectively to become members of and receive support from global party-based democracy networks. In this respect, African democracies are globalized party-based democracies because they are full members of these global democracy networks, which generally operate within the parameters of quasi-polyarchy.

Regardless of their ambivalence toward internal political party democracy and the knowledge that they exhibit quasi-polyarchy characteristics, African political parties have been successful in canvassing vast human, and external and internal financial resources. They are also able to maintain themselves as political organisations with a set of broadly defined values, mobilise popular support, win and lose elections as well as form and, in a few cases, initiate motions of no confidence in government. Measured by these formative political party characteristics, African parties satisfy the requirements of globalized party-based democracies - because they generally assume universal political party functions, or have accommodated to quasi-polyarchy. However, the failure of African party-based democracies to turn into full polyarchies finds recourse in the contention of Dahl and others that it would probably take several generations before such an elusive ambition could be realised.

Therefore, it is evident that global party-based democracy networks have carved three distinct strategies in dealing with international democracy promotion, which is relatively different from fraternal foundations and other multilateral organizations. First, global parliamentary networks promote globalized parliamentary-based democracy by developing the capacity of parliamentarians regardless of their ideological orientation. Second, global party-to-party

networks promote globalized party-based democracy in a bid to bring Africa and other developing countries into conformity with the ethos and core values of “western” party-based democracy. Third, bilateral and multi-lateral institutions pursue global democracy including in Africa, with an aim of strengthening democratic institutions, including of course for parliaments, political parties and the rule of law, constitutional reforms, good governance, and state building among others.

Finally, then, it is difficult to argue that Africa could develop a unique party-based democracy responding to its own political culture and position in the new context of development so long as it operates under the influence of such powerful global parliamentary and party-to-party democracy networks. However, African party-based democracy, as has been demonstrated in this paper, have so far retained some institutional arrangements informed by African levels of socio-economic development and the diverse political cultures, some of which impinge negatively on its overall democratic credence.

---

#### ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> This paper is inspired by Peter Burnell’s position paper entitled “Globalizing Party-based Democracy: Political Parties, Globalization, and International Democracy Assistance”, published in the Working paper Series of the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, April 2005. This guided the deliberations of the workshop with the same title, held at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, University of Warwick, Coventry 7 – 8 July 2005.
- <sup>2</sup> Mohamed Salih, M. A. “Introduction”, in *African Political Parties* (London: Pluto Press, 2003).
- <sup>3</sup> Ibid. p. 2.
- <sup>4</sup> See two contrasting view on the essence of African nationalism before and after independence: Sithole, N. *African Nationalism*. New York: Oxford U.P., 1959 and Hans Kohn and Wallace Sokolsky, *African nationalism in the twentieth century*. (Princeton, N.J: Van Nostrand, 1993)
- <sup>5</sup> Most notably the civil wars in Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and more recently Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
- <sup>6</sup> M. A. Mohamed Salih, *African Democracies and African Politics*. (Londo: Pluto Press, 2001)
- <sup>7</sup> More of this in the section on global party-based democracy networks.
- <sup>8</sup> For more informed discussed, refer to Meghnad Desai and Paul Redfern (eds.), *Global governance: ethics and economics of the world order*. (London, New York: Pinter, 1995) and Per A. Hammarlund, *Liberal internationalism and the decline of the state*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
- <sup>9</sup> I used polyarchy because much of the current jargon on good governance was rehashed from this notion and in most cases, without even referring to it.
- <sup>10</sup> For more on quasi-polyarchy in Africa refer to Mohamed Salih, *African Democracies and African Politics* (London: Pluto Press, 2001).
- <sup>11</sup> Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 5-8.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid.: p. 47.
- <sup>13</sup> (Ibid.: p. 5)
- <sup>14</sup> The table also shows that the NPP and other smaller parties which were not in alliance with the NDC boycotted the 1993 parliamentary elections and therefore, not represented in parliament.

- 
- <sup>15</sup> For a fuller account, refer to Ernest Aryeetey, Jane Harrigan and Machiko Nissanke (eds.) *Economic reforms in Ghana: The miracle and the mirage*. (Oxford; Accra; Trenton, NJ: James Currey; Woeli Publishing Services; Africa World Press, 2000).
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>18</sup> NDC is the only Ghanaian political party member of Socialist International; see the section on global party-to-party networks.
- <sup>21</sup> As the initial success of these policies waned between 1997 and 1999, Kenya's Enhanced Structural Adjustment were introduced with the aim of revitalizing economic reform policy, including civil service reform and the pursuance of stronger anti-corruption efforts.<sup>21</sup>
- <sup>22</sup> Mwangi S. Kimenyi and John Mukum Mbaku, "Institutions and Economic Growth", in Mwangi S. Kimenyi, John Mukum Mbaku and Ngure Mwaniki (eds.) *Restarting and sustaining economic growth and development in Africa : the case of Kenya*. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).
- <sup>23</sup> For a more detail on this see Martin Ott, Phiri, Kings Mbacazwa, Nandini Patel, *Malawi's Second Democratic Elections: Process, Problems, and Prospects*, (Blantyre: Christian Literature Association in Malawi, 2000).
- <sup>25</sup> Wilfred Sumani Malawi: Messianic Era or Another Babylon? In JCTR Bulletin No. 61, Article 10, Third Quarter 2004. Published by (Lilongwe: Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR).
- <sup>26</sup> Election Manifestos of UDF and MCP, 1994, 1999 and 2004.
- <sup>27</sup> See Mkandawire, M. L. *Poverty, Democracy and Macro-economic Management: The Case of Malawi*. (Harare: SAPES Books, 1999) and Englund, H. (eds.) *A democracy of chameleons: Politics and culture in the new Malawi*. (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002).
- <sup>29</sup> Such as the fraternal party foundations in Europe and the United States.
- <sup>30</sup> See Herman, Valintine, *Parliaments of the World: a reference compendium*. Berlin, New York : DeGruyter, 1976; See Article (1), of the Statues of International Parliamentary Union, Geneva, 1976, p. 1. For more recent information on activities visit IPU website : <http://www.ipu.org/>
- <sup>31</sup> This took place at its 161st session held in Cairo, 16 September 1997. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration in its 51<sup>st</sup> Session on 20 December 1996. Article (2) of the Declaration, states that, "Democracy is both an ideal to be pursued and a mode of government to be applied according to modalities which reflect the diversity of experiences and cultural particularities without derogating from internationally recognised principles, norms and standards. It is thus a constantly perfected and always perfectible state or condition whose progress will depend upon a variety of political, social, economic, and cultural factors".
- <sup>32</sup> Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Constitutions, adopted in Cyprus 1993, revised in Canada 2004. Interviews with African parliamentarians involved in the Ghana Workshop to Strengthen Legislatures in West Africa, Greenland Hotel, Agona Swedro, 11-14 February 2005 and CPA website: <http://www.cpahq.org/>.
- <sup>33</sup> There is an Africa-wide parliament called Pan-African Parliament, and four sub-regional parliaments: The East African Legislative Assembly; SADC Parliamentary Forum; The Economic Community of West African States Parliament (ECOWAS-P) and the Maghreb Union Assembly (UMA).
- <sup>34</sup> The suspension of Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Fiji and Pakistan from the Commonwealth due to their reversal to military or authoritarian rule is a case in point, where CAP uses its political clout to discipline its members.
- <sup>35</sup> The other African parties, which are part of IDU are: Cape Verde (Movimento para la Democracia (MD); Cameroon (Democrat Progressive Party of Cameroon); Congo (Brazzaville) (Movement for Democracy and Solidarity); Congo (DR), (Democrat and Social Christian Party), Mauritania (Union pour la Démocratiè et le Progress (UDP) Party); Mauritius (Democratic Union of Mauritius) and Madagascar (FANORENANA). There are also three observer political parties: Morocco (Istiglal literally translated into Independence) Party), Mozambique (Mozambique National Resistance) and Uganda (Democratic Party).
- <sup>36</sup> I refer to the continued accusation of political parties mandated to govern on a platform for fighting corruption only to become corrupt after accession to power. For example, Ben Ephson of the Centre for Global Integrity writes, Fred Oluoch writes in the Kenya based News from Africa Bulletin (August Issue 2004) that the emergence of "new corruption" in the National Rainbow

---

Coalition [NARC] government has led to the suspension by the European Union [EU] of aid to Kenya barely eight months after a group of donors resumed lending to the country. Ben Ephson reports "Of 133 countries included in the 2003 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Ghana ranked 70th with a score of 3.3 on a 10 point scale, the same score it received in 1999. This represented a drop from a score of 3.9, which it received in 2002—an indication, some charged, that despite the government's declared war on corruption, not much has been achieved". For more details see: <http://www.public-i.org/ga/country.aspx?cc=gh&act=notebook>. In Malawi, the story is not different. A Report written by Nixon Khembo for Transparency International (TI) released on May 17, 2005, laments, "'The study finds that corruption increased in Malawi as a result of weak institutions of state restraint. That is to say, parliamentary oversight was weak because of executive dominance, accounting systems were not efficient due to lack of resources, constitutional bodies depended largely on foreign donors for their functions, and political parties in Government depended on state resources for their survival and activities". Transparency International, National Integrity System in Malawi Country Report 2005. (Ber lin: Transparency International, May 2005).

<sup>37</sup> Blakers, Margaret (ed.) *The Global Greens: The story of the Global Green 2001* in Canberra. 2001. Canberra: Australian Greens and the Green Institute, 2001. See also the Global Greens Website: <http://www.globalgreens.info>

<sup>38</sup> Examples are Friend of the Earth and Green Peace campaigns against Shell Oil Company operations in the Nigerian Delta and the fate of the Ogoni people.

<sup>39</sup> Global party-to-party partnerships have developed strict criteria which restrict membership only to those political parties which fulfil all the requirements laid down in their constitutions.

<sup>40</sup> For more on modernization revisionism, refer to M. A. Mohamed Salih's "Introduction" in M.A. *African Democracies and African Politics* (London: Pluto, 2001).

<sup>42</sup> For more on AFORD-United Democratic Front ethnicity and language policy and politics see Kamwendo, G. "Ethnic Revival and Language Associations in the New Malawi", in Harri Englund (Ed.) *A Democracy of Chameleons: Politics and Culture in the New Malawi*. (Uppsala: Nordic Institute of African Studies, 2001), pp. 140-150.

<sup>43</sup> For more on ethnicity and politics in these three countries, refer to Lenz, C. and Paul Nugent (eds.) *Ethnicity in Ghana: The Limits of Invention*. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); Chirwa, C. W. "The Politics of Ethnicity and Regionalism in Contemporary Malawi", in *African Rural and Regional Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1994, pp. 93-118; Muigai, G. "Ethnicity and the Renewal of Competitive Politics in Kenya", in Harvey Glickman (ed.) *Ethnic Conflicts and Democratization in Africa*. (Atlanta Ga.: African Studies Association Press, 1995), 161-196; and Kalipeni, E., "Regional Polarisation in Voting Pattern: Malawi 1994 Elections", in *African Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1997, pp. 152-167.

<sup>44</sup> See Clapham pp. 58-59 who also argues in the same vein that, "This process (client-patron relations) leads to resource allocations often very different from those, which would be produced by 'universal criteria of efficiency, and need.'"

<sup>45</sup> Berman, Bruce, J., "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism", in *African Affairs*, Vol. 97, 1998, pp. 305-341.

<sup>46</sup> Tangri, Roger. *The Politics of Patronage in Africa: Parastatals, Privatization and Private Enterprise*. (Oxford: James Currey, 1999).

<sup>47</sup> Donald Kipkorir. *The East African Standard*, 19 June 2005.

<sup>48</sup> Ghanaian, Kenyan and Malawian newspapers are awash with corruption scandals and claims and counter claims of the involvement of British AshantiGold, Lorno International and South African business interests in buying favours from the governing political parties, in these countries, respectively.

<sup>49</sup> Refer to Jan Art scholte, chapter 11 entitled "Globalization and (Un)democracy" of Jan Aart Scholte *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*. (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2005, second edition).

<sup>50</sup> I refer particularly to the corruption scandals which gripped Ghana, Kenya and Malawi only a few months after the opposition political parties took the reign of power from the one-party states.

- 
- <sup>51</sup> Mwakyembe, H. G. “ Democracy and Political Stability and one-Party System in East Africa” , in A. Beyene and G. Mutahaba (eds.) *The Quest for Constitutionalism in East Africa*. Bern: Peter Lang, 1994)
- <sup>52</sup> President Kufuor of Ghana was Member of Parliament and Deputy foreign Minister in 1969, President Kibaki of Kenya was Vice President (1978 to 1988) and Bakili Muluzi the first President of Malawi during multiparty democracy was Minister of Education (1976-1977) and Minister of Transport and Communication (1977-1981).
- <sup>53</sup> Chiroro, Bertha. Political Parties and Democratic Governance- South Africa and Zimbabwe. (Paper presented at the UNISA Africa Day Conference, UNISA, Pretoria; 2 June 2005).
- <sup>54</sup> Refer to Peter Burnell’s position paper entitled “Globalizing Party-based Democracy: Political Parties, Globalization, and International Democracy Assistance”, published in the Working paper Series of the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, April 2005. Jan Art Scholte, chapter 11 entitled “Globalization and (Un)democracy” of Jan Aart Scholte *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*. (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2005 second edition).

---

CSGR Working Paper Series

|                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 135/04, June      | J A Scholte<br>Globalisation Studies Past and Future: A Dialogue of Diversity                                                                                                                                                         |
| 136/04, June      | D Drache<br>The Political Economy of Dissent: Global Publics After Cancun                                                                                                                                                             |
| 137/04, June      | M L Saguier<br>Convergence in the Making: Transnational Civil Society and the Free Trade Area of the Americas                                                                                                                         |
| 138/04, June      | J Haselip<br>The Globalisation of Utilities Liberalisation: Impacts upon the poor in Latin America                                                                                                                                    |
| 139/04, June      | S Sullivan & D Brockington<br>Qualitative methods in globalisation studies: or saying something about the world without counting or inventing it.                                                                                     |
| 140/04, September | S Hiss<br>Corporate Social Responsibility: A Myth? The Example of the “Round Table Codes of Conduct” in Germany                                                                                                                       |
| 141/04, September | S Hiss<br>Does Corporate Social Responsibility need Social Capital? The Example of the „Sector Model Social Responsibility” of the “Foreign Trade Association of the German Retail Trade (AVE)”, a Public Private Partnership Project |
| 142/04, October   | G F Thompson<br>The Fate of Territorial Engineering: Mechanisms of Territorial Power and Post-Liberal Forms of International Governance                                                                                               |
| 143/04, October   | P Conconi & C Perroni<br>The Economics of Special and Differential Trade Regimes                                                                                                                                                      |
| 144/04, October   | G Grimalda & M Vivarelli<br>One or Many Kuznets Curves? Short and Long Run Effects of the Impact of Skill-Biased Technological Change on Income Inequality                                                                            |
| 145//04, October  | J Whalley<br>Rationality, Irrationality and Economic Cognition                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 146/04, October   | M Redoano<br>Does Centralization Affect the Number and Size of Lobbies?                                                                                                                                                               |
| 147/04, October   | M P Devereaux, B Lockwood and M Redoano<br>Horizontal and Vertical Indirect Tax Competition: Theory and Some Evidence from the USA                                                                                                    |
| 148/04, October   | M Besfamille & B Lockwood<br>Are Hard Budget Constraints for Sub-National Governments Always Efficient?                                                                                                                               |
| 149/04, October   | P S Martins<br>Do Foreign Firms <i>Really</i> Pay Higher Wages? Evidence from Different Estimators                                                                                                                                    |

---

|                  |                                                                                                                                            |
|------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 150/04, October  | R Icaza<br>Civil Society in Mexico and Regionalisation<br>A Framework for Analysis on<br>Transborder Civic Activism                        |
| 151/04, November | G Grimalda<br>A Game-Theoretic Framework to Study the Influence of Globalisation on Social<br>Norms of Co-operation                        |
| 152/04, October  | M Caselli<br>Some Reflections on Globalization, Development and the Less Developed Countries                                               |
| 153/04, November | D Leech & R Leech<br>Voting Power and Voting Blocs                                                                                         |
| 154/04, November | D Leech & R Leech<br>Voting Power in the Bretton Woods Institutions                                                                        |
| 155/05           | B Lockwood & M Redoano                                                                                                                     |
| 156/05, January  | D Leech & R Leech<br>Voting Power implications of a Unified European Representation at the IMF                                             |
| 157/05, February | H Nesadurai<br>Conceptualising Economic Security in an Era of Globalisation: What Does the East<br>Asian Experience Reveal?                |
| 158/05, February | S Sullivan<br>'Viva Nihilism!' On militancy and machismo in (anti-)globalisation protest                                                   |
| 159/05, March    | S Ghosal and K Thampanishvong<br>Sovereign Debt Crisis: Coordination, Bargaining and Moral Hazard                                          |
| 160/05, May      | R Cohen<br><br>The free movement of money and people: debates before and after '9/11'                                                      |
| 161/05, May      | E Tsingou<br>Global governance and transnational financial crime: opportunities and tensions in<br>the global anti-money laundering regime |
| 162/05, May      | S. Zahed<br>'Iranian National Identity in the Context of Globalization: dialogue or resistance?'                                           |
| 163/05, May      | E. Bielsa<br>'Globalisation as Translation: An Approximation to the Key but Invisible Role of<br>Translation in Globalisation'             |
| 164/05, May      | J. Faundez<br>'The rule of law enterprise – towards a dialogue between practitioners and<br>academics'                                     |
| 165/05, May      | M. Perkmann<br>'The construction of new scales: a framework and case study of the EUREGIO cross-<br>border region'                         |
| 166/05, May      | M. Perkmann<br>'Cross-border co-operation as policy entrepreneurship: explaining the variable<br>success of European cross-border regions' |

---

|                |                                                                                                                                                                    |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 167/05, May    | G. Morgan<br>'Transnational Actors, Transnational Institutions, Transnational spaces: The role of law firms in the internationalisation of competition regulation' |
| 168/05, May    | G. Morgan, A. Sturdy and S. Quack<br>'The Globalization of Management Consultancy Firms: Constraints and Limitations'                                              |
| 169/05, May    | G. Morgan and S. Quack<br>'Institutional legacies and firm dynamics: The growth and internationalisation of British and German law firms'                          |
| 170/05, May    | C Hoskyns and S Rai<br>'Gendering International Political Economy'                                                                                                 |
| 171/05, August | James Brassett<br>'Globalising Pragmatism'                                                                                                                         |
| 172/05, August | Jiro Yamaguchi<br>'The Politics of Risk Allocation Why is Socialization of Risks Difficult in a Risk Society?'                                                     |
| 173/05, August | M. A. Mohamed Salih<br>'Globalized Party-based Democracy and Africa: The Influence of Global Party-based Democracy Networks'                                       |

*Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation*  
University of Warwick  
Coventry CV4 7AL,  
UK

Tel: +44 (0)24 7657 2533  
Fax: +44 (0)24 7657 2548  
Email: [csg@warwick.ac.uk](mailto:csg@warwick.ac.uk)  
Web address: <http://www.csg.org>

CSGR Working Paper Series 232/07. University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalisation. pp. 1-35. Determinants and consequences of bargaining power in households. Center for Retirement Research, NBER Working Paper No. 12367. Boston: Boston College. [20]. Garcia-Moreno, C., Jansen, H. A., Ellsberg, M., Heise, L., and Watts, C. H. (2006).

@inproceedings{Marcet2005WorkingPS, title={Working Paper Series Working Paper n o 173 Incomplete Markets , Labor Supply and Capital Accumulation}, author={A. Marcet}, year={2005} }. A. Marcet. Published 2005. We explore the accumulation of capital in the presence of limited insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, borrowing constraints and endogenous labor supply. In the exogenous labor supply case (e.g. Aiyagari 1994, Huggett 1997), the presence of limited insurance increases the demand for savings for precautionary reasons. J. A. Scholte, "Global Civil Society: Changing the World," CSGR Working Paper, University of Warwick, Warwick, 1999, pp. 1-35. has been cited by the following article: TITLE: The Role of Global Civil Society in Global Governance. AUTHORS: Vivek Kumar Mishra. KEYWORDS: Global Civil Society (GCS); Global Governance; International Non Governmental Organisations (INGO); Trans National Corporations (TNCs). DOI: 10.4236/blr.2012.34026 7 173 Downloads 12 860 Views Citations. Pub. Date: December 26, 2012. Disaster Management and Working with Displaced Persons (Methodological Paper). Odeyoyin Yusuph Abiodun, Adekanmbi C. Odunayo, Sana Ayub, Mamta Kumari. DOI: 10.4236/ojtr.2021.92003 73 Downloads 178 Views Citations. Eleni Tsingou CSGR Working Paper No 161/05 May 2005 Global governance and transnational financial crime: opportunities and tensions in the global anti-money laundering regime. Eleni Tsingou CSGR Working Paper No. 161/05 May 2005. Abstract. This paper examines the global anti-money laundering regime, assesses its purpose and draws some conclusions with regards to its effectiveness as a tool for targeting transnational financial crime. The paper shows that targeting money laundering is presented as a means of strengthening the integrity of the financial system and tackling organised crime throu