



GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF
ARMED FORCES (DCAF)

OCCASIONAL PAPER – NO. 1

MANAGING CHANGE

THE REFORM AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF THE SECURITY SECTOR AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Ambassador Dr. Theodor H. Winkler

*Director, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces, Switzerland*

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MANAGING CHANGE

THE REFORM AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF THE SECURITY SECTOR AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Theodor H. Winkler

A beautiful butterfly flapping its wings somewhere deep in the rain forests of the Amazonas will have an impact on the speed with which the polar ice caps melt. For we live in an interdependent world.

Introduction

When the Berlin Wall came crashing down and the Cold War reluctantly proved, to everybody's surprise, to be truly over, there was an apparent, almost embarrassing inability to define the key parameters that would mark the new era that had obviously dawned. Even to give it a name proved difficult. The best attempt still remains "Post Cold War World", i.e. a negative description (the absence of the Cold War) and not a positive analysis of what truly marks the emerging new international system.

Clearly, what followed the Cold War, was not the "New World Order" US President George Bush had proclaimed during the Gulf War. There was, during the Clinton Administration, a strengthening of the role of the United Nations and multilateral diplomacy (evidenced *inter alia* by the creation of Partnership for Peace and later the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council). Yet the interest of the United States, perceived now by many as a "hyper-power", in multilateral approaches proved ephemeral and - under the Administration of George W. Bush - highly selective as well as strongly driven by perceived US national interests. The United States would be an unpredictable hegemon, unwilling to underwrite a blank cheque as guarantor of any form of international order.

Nor did we witness the end of history. Quite to the contrary: as soon as the political landscape frozen by the Cold War showed the very first signs of a thaw, history returned – and with a vengeance. Nationalism and religious fundamentalism

reasserted themselves as political forces to be reckoned with. Wars of succession erupted – not only over the inheritance of parts of the former Soviet Union, but also in former Yugoslavia. There were widespread attempts to redraw borders in blood. The terrible phrase "ethnic cleansing" entered the political vocabulary. A century, which had started catastrophically in Sarajevo, threatened also to end there in no less tragic a way, when the Balkans fell back into its deadly habit of producing more history than the region can stomach.

Nor has mankind fully entered the age of globalisation, so far. There are, of course, major steps in that direction: the astounding revolution in information technologies¹, the step from the old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and a clear trend towards truly integrated global financial markets. Yet much of this globalisation remains patchy. In information technologies, a growing digital divide is opening up, a deepening dot-com abyss and an exploding cyber gap. While computer technology is advancing with breathtaking speed in the North, half of the world's population has yet to make a single phone call in their life. Computer densities vary widely – not only from continent to continent (with Africa lagging dramatically behind), but indeed from country to country. With respect to the WTO, substantial parts of the global population still have to be convinced that the benefits outweigh the drawbacks. The shareholder bubble has burst. Not only have thousands of billions of dollars of stock investments been destroyed in the last 12 months by persistently bearish markets; more significantly, the notion has been buried, hopefully for good, that one production factor, "capital", can claim and reap over a sustained period of time a return 10 or 20 times larger than the other production factors (notably "labour") and the growth rate of the overall economy. The political backlash that started in Seattle, Prague and Genoa has since been powerfully amplified by Enron, Worldcom and other corporate scandals.

The facts are indeed sobering. If anything, what has been globalised has not been prosperity, order and security, but – as 11 September 2001 brutally illustrated – terrorism, organised crime and violence. The probability of a conflict along the lines of 1914-18 or 1939-45 has gone – at least for the reasonably foreseeable future. The Euro-Atlantic area has the potential to gradually grow into a zone of economic and political integration and hence of peace and stability. The international system as a *whole* however does not share that perspective. Much of the rest of the world,

¹ For a vision of what that revolution might entail cf. Michael Dertouzos, *What Will Be. How the New World of Information will Change Our Lives*, Harper, San Francisco, 1997, 368 p.

particularly – but not only – Africa and the crescent of instability along the southern rim of the former Soviet Union (from the Caucasus to Southwest Asia), have, to the contrary, witnessed a significant increase in war, conflict, death, mutilation, and horror. Never before in the history of mankind have there been as many refugees and internally displaced persons as today. Never before have there been so many small arms floating around. Never before were there so many “failed states” (or as the French so aptly put it “des entités chaotiques non-gouvernables”²).

We are today indeed confronted with a combination of the absence of a genuine international *order* and the reality of a growing zone marked by a dangerous fragmentation of power.

Since the dawn of mankind the quest for security has been a (if not *the*) predominant reason for the formation of communities and – ultimately – states. That quest for security has been accompanied, as its inseparable twin, by the recognition that the monopoly of power, and particularly the monopoly of the legitimate exercise of force, has to be vested in the community, the state – and cannot rest anywhere else.

Yet today’s international reality is marked by a growing number of countries that lose that crucial monopoly of force, farm it out, at least partly, to private companies and organisations, become gradually unable to impose their will on the armed forces and factions within the country, or have to fear the wrath of hidden, non-transparent (and therefore, in the public consciousness, all the more dangerous) armed and powerful remnants of totalitarianism or other extremist factions able to threaten, if not to overthrow, the government, democratic institutions and the rule of law. The international reach and power of organised crime are growing daily. Its ability to marshal financial resources advanced technology, and – if necessary – even superior firepower is dwarfing that of police forces in many countries. The annual income from illegal drug-trafficking alone is today greater than that from the world oil business.

The security of the average human being has been decreasing since the end of the Cold War. This is particularly true for people living in Africa, parts of Latin America and Asia or in one of the world’s crisis zones such as Algeria, the Middle East, the Western Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, South-West Asia and to some extent Northeast Asia. Yet it is no less true for many of the world’s big cities. Thus, to be

² Bartholomäus Grill, cited in Erhard Eppler, *Vom Gewaltmonopol zum Gewaltmarkt*, edition Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 2002, p. 51.

shot has become the most likely cause of death for young Afro-American males³. Private security companies that offer their services have turned into a major business – from the US to the big cities in the southern hemisphere. Sex slavery is a reality also in the red light districts of Europe⁴. Even piracy on the high seas is on the rise⁵. In short, security is no longer something that can be simply taken for granted. It risks becoming a commodity only some of us can enjoy and of which a growing number of people are deprived.

It is of crucial importance to reverse these trends. Among the key reasons for the decrease in human security are the absence, the collapse, or the fragmentation of the monopoly of legitimate force of the state – and hence the collapse of a functioning security sector that functions efficiently and in a transparent way under civilian and democratic control. It is indeed increasingly recognised that the reform and control of the security sector is an indispensable precondition for human and economic development.⁶

At the same time, many countries still maintain armed forces and a security apparatus that are geared to respond to the threats and contingencies of the Cold War. Cooperation between the various pillars of the international system in the area of security remains, more often than not, embryonic and in any case selective. Even inside highly advanced Western countries cooperation between various security agencies remains far from perfect. Thus Switzerland – with its 7.2 million inhabitants – knows no less than 400 different police corps⁷, not all of which have secure means of communicating with each other. Similarly, the post-9/11 investigations in the United States have shown serious deficiencies in cooperation between various US security agencies which impacted on their ability to provide a timely warning.

³ There are, on average, 15,000 to 20,000 murder victims per year in the US (“Club”, SFDRS, 13 August 2002).

⁴ The number of women sold into prostitution from Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America is estimated worldwide at anywhere between 700,000 and 4,000,000 per year. Between 120,000 and 500,000 victims of this modern trade in human beings are estimated to be sold annually to brothels and pimps in Europe. Profits from sex slavery are estimated at 7-12 billion dollars a year. Cf. Marianne Truttmann, *Mit vereinten Kräften gegen die Sklaverei*, in *Der Bund*, 21 September 2002, p. 5.

⁵ Eppler, *op.cit.*, pp.40-41, cf. also Christoph Plate, *Entzauberung der Seeräuber-Romantik; Vor den Küsten Südostasiens und Afrikas ist die von Freibeutern ausgehende Gefahr besonders gross*, *NZZ* am Sonntag, 25 August, 2002, p. 3.

⁶ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2002*, New York, 2002, Chapter 4, pp. 85-100, UNIDIR, *Disarmament Forum*, No. 2/2002, Dylan Hendrickson, Andrzej Karkoszka, *The Challenges of Security Sector Reform*, SIPRI Yearbook 2002, Stockholm, 2002, pp. 175-201.

⁷ Information supplied by the Swiss Police Institute.

The reform and the democratic control of the security sector have thus become, at the threshold of the 21st century, a key challenge – for the Euro-Atlantic region as much as for the developing world.

The Concept of Security Sector Reform

The term and the notion of “security sector reform” are, surprisingly enough, quite recent. Raised as an issue in the context of good governance, the term as such was first used by Clare Short in 1997⁸ and later further developed by several British academics, notably at King’s College and Bradford University⁹; it has, however, not yet fully entered even the US academic, let alone policy debate. There exists, obviously, a vast amount of literature on civil-military relations¹⁰ and the democratic control of armed forces¹¹. But there has been only recently a growing interest in the interrelationship between, on the one hand, the armed forces, the police and other internal security agencies, border guards and the intelligence community and, on the other hand, between those components of the security sector and the institutions of a democratic state (most notably the government, parliament and the judiciary, but – in a wider sense – also civil society at large). Even then, the debate kicked off by British experts and picked up by Canadian¹², Dutch¹³, German¹⁴ and a few US¹⁵ experts focused initially to a large extent on security sector reform in the context of development cooperation.

The absence of effective security structures under civilian and democratic control forms an insurmountable obstacle to sustained development. Without security there can simply be no sustained development, nor any progress towards democracy, stability and peace. The problems posed are, however, not restricted to developing countries. They are of a much broader relevance – as is consequently also the concept of security sector reform.

⁸ DFID, *Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century*, White Paper on International Development, London, 1997.

⁹ Among others by Michael Clarke, Anthony Forster, Owen Green, Tim Edmunds, Malcolm Chalmers, Dylan Hendrikson.

¹⁰ Notably Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1957.

¹¹ Much pioneering work was done in the 1950s and 1960s under the heading of “*Innere Führung*” by General Graf Baudesin and his successors in the young *Bundeswehr*.

¹² e.g. Marina Caparini.

¹³ e.g. Hans Born.

¹⁴ Most notably Erhard Eppler.

¹⁵ Notably Nicole Ball.

Every country has, in the security realm, some basic, clearly defined interests, most notably: the ability to protect and, if necessary, defend its territory, air space, sea frontiers, critical national infrastructure, and national interests; to guard its borders against illegal and clandestine entry or exit of persons and goods; to safeguard the security, physical safety and the property of its citizens and inhabitants; to protect the country against organised crime, terrorist attack or acts by any sort of group that aims to overthrow through violent means the constitutional order or the existing state structures or to gain control over at least parts of the state territory.

Each of these tasks must be assigned as a clearly defined mission to a specific component of a country's security structure – from the armed forces to traffic police. Those various specific missions should, ideally, be based on a comprehensive national security policy – a public document defined and adopted by the political leadership, i.e. the government and parliament, after a broad public debate involving all political parties and civil society. The mission thus assigned to each component of the national security structure must be clear, specific and unique. Their sum total must address all aspects of national security, both internal and external. Each component of the security structures must, however, not only be responsible for the efficient fulfilment of the mission assigned to it, but also accountable for any failure to do so. Accountability requires as its corollary transparency in the execution of the mission assigned. The dual requirement of transparency and accountability firmly link the concept of security sector reform with that of good governance and with the protection of human rights and security.

Put simply: (1) everybody needs to know what he has to do; (2) everybody needs to know what everybody else has to do; (3) there should be no overlapping missions, no duplication, and no important missions not clearly assigned to somebody; (4) the whole must form a team; (5) everybody is responsible for getting the job efficiently done in accordance with the Constitution and the law and is accountable if he fails to do so.

There are obviously some special cases. The intelligence community needs its legitimate secrets protected. Its work cannot be fully transparent to the public. Yet the price of that protection must be an increased parliamentary control through highly competent special parliamentary committees and high professional standards imposed on these agencies (clear legislation, judiciary oversight over certain activities such as phone tapping, an internal moral codex, an internal legal office

advising on the constitutionality and legality of each operation). The power to declare a state of emergency is another such case. A state of emergency normally permits the use of armed forces to safeguard domestic security and to temporarily suspend certain rights under *habeas corpus*. Again, these additional rights of the security sector need to be compensated through additional democratic oversight procedures. The legislation concerning the declaration of a state of emergency must thus be embedded in the Constitution (and cannot be above it) and contain a parliamentary control mechanism. Armed forces used in a state of emergency in a domestic law and order function cannot exercise that function instead of, or parallel to, the regular police, but only in a subsidiary capacity under the normal civilian command channels. The requirements of not only democratic, but also legal responsibility (and hence both political and judicial accountability) cannot be waived for the security structures.

And there are some traps, notably the temptation to blur the borderline between police and armed forces – the reason most often advanced being that the military are confronted today in peace-support operations increasingly with tasks of an essentially policing nature¹⁶. While this is obviously true – and requires additional training – the point should not be over-stretched. Peace-support operations present armed forces *in general* with a fundamentally different task: they are on such missions – in order to highlight just one point *pars pro toto* – called upon to prevent the outbreak of violence (and to respond only proportionally to any outbreak of violence, if it should nevertheless occur), whereas in traditional military operations their job is to bring to bear overwhelming force on the critical point. Moreover, if the right to investigate, arrest and indict should be split among several security agencies, a mortal blow would be given to the idea of the rule of law. At home, armed forces should only be called upon to assist the police or other internal security forces, if used in a subsidiary role and under the strict operational command – and political control – of a civilian authority¹⁷. Abroad, armed forces engaged in peace-support operations should – in their policing role – similarly be subordinated to a civilian, not a military authority. Otherwise it would be extremely difficult to move from a post-conflict situation towards the necessary state- and institution-building and to establish the rule of law.

¹⁶ Cf. Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars; Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1999, pp. 124 ff, or Erhard Eppler, *op.cit.*, pp. 110 ff.

¹⁷ Cf. The excellent notion of the “*miles protector*” in Gustav Däniker, *Wende Golfkrieg; Vom Wesen und Gebrauch zukünftiger Streitkräfte*, Huber, Frauenfeld, 1992.

It is no accident that totalitarian states, dictatorships, and to some extent also authoritarian governments ignore these simple principles. Such countries tend not only to maintain an overblown security apparatus – thus squandering scarce resources – but also security structures whose missions are purposefully blurred and overlapping. Thus Hitler's Third Reich did not only have the *Wehrmacht* and the Police, but also the SA, the SS (including the *Waffen-SS*), the SD, Gestapo, the *Organisation Todt* and scores of other more or less independent players. Towards the end of the war, Goering's *Luftwaffe* was, besides its air component, also the proud owner of parachute formations and straightforward infantry divisions.

Much the same can be said about the Soviet Union and its legacy. Even today, out of some five million men and women serving in Russia's security sector only 1.3 million belong to the armed forces proper. In many of the other successor states to the former Soviet Union the picture looks even worse.

The reason is obvious: an overblown and badly structured security sector permits the leadership to assure its supremacy by balancing the different components of the security apparatus against each other and, if necessary, by being able to play off one against another. It is the age-old dictum of *divide et impera*.

The issue of the reform of the security sector inherited from the past is, therefore, of crucial importance for the countries of Central, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe as well as Central Asia. If that process is not successfully embarked upon, there remains the grave risk, not only of a state within the state, but indeed of several states within the state. Democracy cannot develop if the population knows that the security apparatus is not under firm political and democratic control, but able to strike out independently at any given moment – be it by putting pressure on the government, by exempting its own budget, structures, procurement processes, infrastructures and personnel from democratic scrutiny, or even by toppling the government. If the security sector remains like an iceberg, of whose power and influence only a small portion is openly visible – while everybody knows that a lot more is hidden under the surface – then democracy cannot flourish, human rights, dignity and security are in jeopardy, and the road to good governance, socio-economic development and the rule of law is blocked.

Moreover – and this factor is often overlooked – the security job will be done in a wasteful and chaotic way – and hence at best inefficiently, at worst ineffectively. A

system built on the concept of *divide et impera* and mutual mistrust cannot be expected to function as a cohesive structure. Thus overblown and ill-structured security forces do not increase, but decrease national security. The military track record of dictatorships is, if compared with that of democracies, actually far from convincing.

Much of what has been said about dictatorships is also true with respect to failing – and faltering – states. Here the problem has usually a different origin: the government is, depending on the case, either losing or giving up the crucial monopoly of the legitimate use of force. That monopoly can be eroded through action from below: warlords, national sub-groups, elements of organised crime or groups within society which gain *de facto* control over parts of the territory and/or arrogate certain aspects of state authority. Tragic examples are in this respect Colombia, Somalia, Sierra Leone or Liberia. The monopoly can, however, also be eroded purposefully from above. Examples of the latter are “death squads” or the acceptance of other forms of privatised force. Very often the two trends combine. Once corruption becomes rampant among the security structures of a country – as it does today in dozens of countries – the step is a small one for elements of the security apparatus, organised crime, warlords, and political extremists to form unholy alliances. In such an environment democracy has no chance, investments will not materialise and hopelessness will be nourished by poverty, hunger, social disruption and the daily reality of arbitrary violence. The results will be social unrest, migration, refugees, death, and despair.

Modern peace and conflict research distinguishes between conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, treating them as three distinct stages. Security sector reform is a key element in all three of them. It is obvious that the likelihood of internal, if not external, conflict significantly increases if a government loses the monopoly of the exercise of legitimate force. The ability to conclude an agreement to end a conflict (be it only a temporary ceasefire), let alone a lasting peace, again depends strongly on the ability of both sides to actually control the armed elements on their side once the ink on the document has dried. One can argue that the inability of Arafat to do so (but also the more hidden problem of the Israeli government with respect to the hardcore elements of Israeli settlers in the occupied territories) is one of the great obstacles on the road to an Arab-Israeli peace. Post-conflict reconstruction, finally, deeply depends again on several aspects of security sector reform – from the demobilisation of soldiers and other armed

elements, to the necessity of preventing those people drifting into organised crime, the need to reconstruct (possibly multi-ethnic) security forces after a civil war, and the shaping of a civilian and democratic oversight mechanism that inspires confidence and trust.

Security sector reform is, finally, not a one-off action and must be understood as a process.

A country's security structures must constantly adapt themselves to changing threats. That is exactly what government bureaucracies do not like to do. It is an old adage that armed forces tend to prepare for the last war. There is a good deal of truth in the saying that no antagonism is as deeply rooted as inter-service rivalry. Democracies tend, as Henry Kissinger observed¹⁸, to be reluctant to react to challenges as long as they remain ambiguous – only to find out that once they have become unambiguous, it is extremely difficult, if not too late, to react. Governments tend to react to new challenges, all too often, not when a risk has been identified as real, but when it has truly materialised. Thus there were dozens of books and movies depicting the scenario of a terrorist flying an aeroplane into key US government buildings or to destroy the World Trade Centre – yet Homeland Security was created only after somebody actually did that. Similarly, the risk of the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists is growing – particularly in the form of biological, radiological or otherwise contaminating devices. Yet so far, measures to increase the physical security of critical medical, biological or radiological material remain in most countries minimal¹⁹ – and are likely to remain so until somebody actually triggers such a device.

To sum up, security sector reform is composed of five elements:

- (1) The reforms are guided by the political leadership, according to democratic principles and the needs of state and society.
- (2) The starting point is a broad view of the term “security”, including military, societal, economic and environmental security risks.
- (3) The reforms include all services: military, police, intelligence agencies, state security, paramilitary organisations, and border guards.

¹⁸ Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years*, Little Brown & Co., Boston and Toronto, 1979.

¹⁹ A positive exception is the current US effort to “buy back” weapons-grade uranium contained in nuclear reactor fuel exported by the former Soviet Union to Third World countries.

- (4) Security sector reform is not a one-off event, but a continuous process; it is not a goal in itself, but aims at providing security both to the state and to its citizens.
- (5) The reforms concern both the organisation of the security sector (legal framework, structure of institutions, division of labour) and the human dimension of the security sector services, that is creating services staffed with professionals.

Security sector reform is, thus, a constant challenge. It is, at the same time, a concept that is not only of relevance for the developing world or the young democracies that have succeeded the former Soviet empire, but also for the Euro-Atlantic region. If the region wants to strengthen its own stability and to project stability, peace and prosperity beyond its borders, the transition to a comprehensive understanding of today's security risks is indispensable. In a world of multiple and complex threats and challenges, the step from traditional defence reform to security sector reform is urgent.

Security Sector Reform and the Euro-Atlantic Region

With the end of the Cold War the Euro-Atlantic region has entered a period of profound transformation. That change is marked by four fundamental factors:

First, the risk of a large-scale East-West conflict, escalating – in all probability – quickly into a cataclysmic nuclear exchange, has gone. This follows the disappearance of the risk of traditional intra-European wars through the Franco-German rapprochement and the European institution-building from the 1950s onwards (from the Coal and Steel Pact to the European Union of today).

Secondly, Russia has ceased to be the enemy. There exist in the Russian population²⁰ still strong undercurrents of distrust and hostility towards the West, fuelled not only by old indoctrination and newly hurt pride, but also by the hardly encouraging form in which capitalism and democracy made their entry into the former Soviet Union in the 1990s. These sentiments may – if not properly addressed – evolve into a political time-bomb. For the present though, President Putin, cultivating

²⁰ And even more so in the officer corps of Russia's armed forces.

the image of a new Peter the Great, has made a deliberate choice – above all in favour of Europe, to some extent also in favour of deriving from a loose partnership with the US and from membership of the G-8 as much benefit and prestige as possible. The new NATO-Russia relationship is an expression of this new reality²¹; and so are the almost casual nature of the negotiating history and form of the latest US-Russian agreement on the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons. The text barely fills a page – in sharp contrast to the sweeping nature of its content and of the profound departures from past arms control and verification practices it contains.

Thirdly, the US-European partnership has grown more distant. To some extent, such a shift was inevitable once the threat of a nuclear holocaust had gone and the Soviet Union had dissolved. Even the closest military alliances suffer from wear and tear once peace has returned (as illustrated by the deterioration of Anglo-American relationship in the 11 short years that separated the Victory Days of World War II from the Suez fiasco). Similarly, the growing economic potential of an integrating Europe is bound to steadily reinforce the element of economic and technological rivalry that has always been an inherent aspect of the Trans-Atlantic relationship²². More significantly though, the new US Administration has opted purposefully to give the defence of perceived US national interests first priority; it is determined to go its own way, if necessary irrespective of what its allies and friends do and say. Multilateralism is out, capability-oriented thinking is in. There is hence a dangerous revival, and not only in Europe, of the picture of the “ugly American” that combines all too easily with the United States' role as the sole surviving “hyper-power”.

Finally, European integration, strongly fuelled in the late 1980s by the desire to counterbalance German reunification and render it thus politically possible, is entering a new phase. Both NATO and the European Union are about to opt not just for further enlargement, but for a “big bang”. NATO may invite at the Prague summit in November 2002 up to seven countries²³ to enter into negotiations on membership. The EU could, a month later in Copenhagen, move towards offering membership (possibly as early as 2004) to up to 10 countries²⁴.

²¹ Cf. on this issue Bernard von Plate, *Kampf gegen den Terrorismus: Katalysator für einen Wandel der NATO und eine sicherheitspolitische Zukunft gemeinsam mit Russland?*, SWP-Studie No 28, Berlin, August 2002.

²² Such a competition is particularly evident in the defence industries sector – from Blue Streak in the late 1950s to Airbus and Galileo.

²³ Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

²⁴ Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.

There are many who remain sceptical with respect to the wisdom of those moves²⁵. Much speaks indeed in favour of a slower pace. The arguments put forward range from the trivial (lack of meeting rooms of adequate size at NATO Headquarters), the traditional (how to accommodate CFE in an enlarged NATO) and the bureaucratic (the demand for EU interpreters could double from well over 3,500 today to some 6,000-7,000, if the current language rules are maintained) to much more serious concerns.

Thus the decision-making processes of both institutions are likely to become, to put it mildly, even more complex. There are those who fear that an increasingly unwieldy and dissonant NATO will be an even less attractive partner for the United States and widen the Trans-Atlantic gap (malicious voices pretend that this sober assessment might be the very reason why the US Administration, having in its heart given up on NATO, would no longer oppose a “big bang”). And there is the fear of the military that enlargement could be almost synonymous with forswearing the possibility that *anybody* will ever fulfil the 50 impressive force objectives of the Defence Capabilities Initiative and the beginning of the transforming of NATO into nothing better than some kind of an “armed OSCE”.

Similarly, there is the concern that a European Union that has not succeeded in a profound reorganisation of its existing, cumbersome decision-making structures and processes might with 10 or more new members simply become paralysed. Questions abound: How can 25 members reach agreement when many issues proved to be extremely tough nuts with 15? How to strengthen democracy and the role of the European Parliament? What about such thorny issues as the Common Agricultural Policy or the allocation of the financial resources of both the Cohesion and Structural Funds? What about the prospects for the Euro and a Single Monetary Policy if the wide gulf between the economies of the 15 and the candidate members are taken into account? What about the Common Foreign and Security Policy, if the 15 could, at best, agree on a common – but definitely not a single – CFSP? What about the prospects for a European Security and Defence Policy? In short, there are many who fear that the Union might, at the very least, disintegrate into separate leagues or clubs, if not, at worst, implode and enter a protracted phase of looking inward,

²⁵ e.g. Erich Reiter, *Europas Sicherheit und die EU-Erweiterung; Ungenügende institutionelle Vorbereitung*, NZZ, 29 July, 2002, p. 3, or Thomas Fuller, *As EU Grows Some Fear It Will Burst*, IHT, 20 June, 2002, pp. 1 and 6, and Thomas Fuller, *At What Price A Bigger EU?*, IHT, 13 June, 2002, pp. 1-2.

muddling through and generally losing momentum at the very moment when a rapidly-changing world would need a strong and dynamic Union.

And yet, serious as many of these concerns may be, they are politically no longer relevant enough to stop or even seriously delay the enlargement processes of both institutions. There is, even among many of the critics, a broad consensus that there is only one thing worse than enlargement – not to enlarge. There are those who see in the integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the inescapable logic of European integration – Europe’s “manifest destiny”. There are also those who see it as a strategic vision, as a historic – and probably unique – chance to secure peace, stability and ultimately also prosperity in Europe. And there are finally those who simply realise that there is no alternative.

The price of abandoning the enterprise would indeed dwarf that of moving forward – stiff as the latter may be.

First of all, there exists for the nations of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe simply no alternative to the European vision. Polls may, in several candidate countries, show a substantial amount of apprehension and uneasiness with respect to the consequences of joining the European Union²⁶. There is indeed hardly anybody in what used to be the Warsaw Pact who does not still remember all too vividly the devastating impact the wild capitalism of the first half of the 1990s had on their life, their savings, their perspectives – and the relative stability and predictability of things in general. Yet that uneasiness is nothing compared to the potential consequences of the Euro-Atlantic world slamming the door shut.

There is, moreover, the moral obligation. It was not Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia that surrendered themselves at Yalta to Stalin’s empire. It was not the Baltic Republics - raped first by Stalin, then by Hitler, and then by Stalin again - that opted in favour of becoming for over 45 harsh years nothing more than a footnote on the maps of the region done by the US Cartographic Service.

There is, last but not least, the simple realisation that the West cannot afford to let the vast region that used to be the Soviet empire simply drift. The consequences would be devastating. Migration would become endemic. Organised international

²⁶ Thomas Fuller, *As EU Grows Some Fear It Will Burst*, IHT, 20 June, 2002, p. 6.

crime and Mafia-type structures would evolve into threats of strategic proportions. Investment would shrink. The still fragile, but all-important, turnaround of the economies of Central and Eastern Europe would, in all probability, abruptly come to an end and be replaced by a new, this time prolonged, recession likely to trigger mass migration towards Western Europe, if not to pave the way for authoritarian or even totalitarian regimes. It would be the end of President Putin and of an evolving partnership with the new Russia. A region deprived of hope and betrayed in its need to belong could all too easily again be lost to internal strife and conflict and profound instability. The result would, in short, risk being a new division of Europe. But this time the Western of the two halves might be the one increasingly inclined to erect a new wall dividing the continent – a wall, not necessarily of brick, mortar, and barbed wire, but of visa and trade barriers, mounting xenophobia, and neglect.

But it is not only fear of the consequences of potential failure that drives enlargement. There is equally strongly the recognition, deep down in most Europeans' hearts and minds (and guts), that it is a step in the right direction.

There is the vision of a growing area of political cooperation, economic integration and democratic development from the Atlantic to the Ukrainian border, if not ultimately from Vancouver to Vladivostok. By 2004 an enlarged NATO and EU together might count no less than 860 million inhabitants and show a combined GDP of a staggering 18.6 trillion US dollars²⁷.

There is an historical opportunity, if not to integrate Russia into European politics, then at least to meaningfully and peacefully associate it with European politics.

And there is the recognition that the smouldering powderkegs bordering the Euro-Atlantic integration zone – the crisis hot spots in former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus – cannot gain stability and democracy without a European perspective.

Lord Ismay is said to have described the purpose of NATO as “keeping the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down”. Paraphrasing that dictum, one might describe the emerging Euro-Atlantic zone of integration as keeping the Americans in, the Russians looking West, the Germans integrated, and the East Europeans recovering.

²⁷ 1999 figures, from *The Military Balance 2000-2001*, IISS, London, 2001.

The Greek philosopher Heraclitus once observed that one cannot step twice into the same river. It is equally true that the organisation a country joins cannot be the same as the one it applied to for membership. Both NATO and the EU will change as a result of enlargement.

NATO was always more than merely a military alliance. It was the supreme expression of a community of values and a highly political tool. Many would cite among its best achievements its ability to manage internal quarrels more or less successfully, notably the thorny relationship between Greece and Turkey. It has been, above all, an institution remarkably capable of, and imaginative in, adapting itself to the changing international environment. The end of the Cold War brought not its dissolution (as some expected), but a new role for it. At the London summit of July 1990 NATO offered its hand to the former enemy and invited the countries of the dissolving Warsaw Pact to open liaison offices in Brussels. A year later, at the Rome summit of November 1991, there followed the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (evolving in May 1997 into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), and in January 1994, at the Brussels summit, Partnership for Peace. A special accession process was established step by step and privileged relationships with Russia and Ukraine were initiated and nurtured.

The logic of continuing on that road is powerful. It seems likely that NATO's military dimension will continue to lose in relative importance (though not disappear). There is no enemy left – at least in the traditional sense. The debate of whether a new one could – and above all should – be found out of area (“NATO has to go out of area or out of business”) proved to be narrow-minded and short-lived. It led to the “New Strategic Concept” and its revision review at the Washington summit; but the approach was stillborn. Since the Gulf War it has become ever more evident that the United States is the only power left with the ability to wage – and win – war on a global scale, and that the US does so through *ad hoc* coalitions of the able and the willing, which vary from one case to the next. The United States may on those occasions draw on selected military resources of its European NATO allies, but actually fewer and fewer of them are of a sufficiently advanced technological and professional level as to be meaningfully integrated into US military operations. The purely military value of NATO for the US is thus shrinking.

In stark contrast to that trend, NATO's importance as a political and security policy organisation continues to grow. Both NATO and the European Union will, if opting at

the end of 2002 for the “big bang”, follow the strategy previously already adopted by the Council of Europe, i.e. the hope of best accelerating positive change in the candidate countries through the granting of early membership. Both will be measured by their ability to increase stability in, and the overall prospects of, the new member countries. NATO’s success will no longer be measured, in such a context, by its ability to provide protection from the enemy from without, but by its ability to find answers to the manifold problems within – above all, to provide a positive perspective for the crisis hotspots bordering an enlarged NATO.

There, the list of urgent problems, risks and dangers remains depressingly long: nationalist and ethnic tensions, discredited internal security structures, shadowy (and often armed) remnants of former totalitarian regimes, underground paramilitary structures and invisible Old Boys’ networks, armed gangs of all kinds (including heavily armed elements of organised crime), the threat of the penetration of the region by elements of international terrorism, the risk of renewed civil strife and conflict, social unrest, the endemic problem of corruption and the vast differences in incomes and financial resources between police and the judiciary on the one hand and criminal elements of all kinds on the other, the consequent difficulty of establishing a functioning judiciary and the rule of law, the absence of adequate political, civilian and democratic control over the security structures, the lack of any true expertise and experience in setting up civilian and parliamentary control mechanisms over the security structures, and the lack of an educated and informed civil society (from NGOs through political parties to the media).

Seen against this background, it is perhaps no accident that Article V was invoked by NATO, for the first time ever, not as a response to a traditional military contingency, but in the context of these new threats.

The consequences of the new situation have, however, not been fully grasped yet.

NATO should shift in its debates, structures and operational focus from primarily military responses to a much more comprehensive security understanding and vision, from the old Fulda Gap mentality not only to Sarajevo-type peace support operation scenarios, but to the new Colombia-type realities and evolving 9/11 threats we face today, from the scenario of nuclear war to that of biological or radiological terrorism, from thinking in terms of defence reform to thinking of integrated security sector reform.

A NATO defining its future in such a manner would be of utmost relevance not only to the Euro-Atlantic region and its neighbours – but also to the new US Administration.

Most importantly perhaps, NATO cannot – and should not – do it alone. With the upcoming enlargement of both NATO and the European Union the times are gone, for good, when the two institutions could, at best, ignore each other, at worst jealously make sure that the other is not trespassing on its territory.

A simple example may illustrate the point: Should the European Union this fall, as is expected, take over the responsibility for “Operation Amber Fox” in Macedonia, it would find as its neighbours, on the one hand NATO’s KFOR in Kosovo which has, at least at night, little ability (and perhaps inclination) to guard the border with Macedonia, and on the other an Albania which, for lack of resources, cannot fully control its border with Macedonia. Both borders are notorious for illegal crossings of both elements of organised crime (which have exploited the internal tensions in Macedonia to establish around Tetovo a *de facto*, almost Colombia-type, police-free haven that attracts all sorts of illegal activities) and armed Albanian gangs aiming at splitting up Macedonia (and possibly to overthrow also the existing political balance in Albania). If there is no coordinated international effort and programme – shaped jointly by the EU and NATO and anybody else involved – to strengthen the border guard regime in such volatile places, and if the EU and NATO force commanders cannot speak to each other, coordinate their activities, and cooperate according to pre-established rules, the outcome will be casualties among their troops, and potentially also renewed conflict. And that conflict could, at worst, not only explode Macedonia and inflame Albania; it could as easily bounce back again into Kosovo, Southern Serbia and even Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In real life, NATO and the European Union have long ago begun to converge.

Thus, after enlargement, membership in NATO and EU is likely to increasingly overlap. Today the two organisations count a combined total of 23 member-countries, of which 11 (48%) are members of both. By 2004 the combined total membership will, if both organisations opt for the “big bang”, have risen to 32 – of which 19 (60%) would be members of both NATO and the European Union. In terms of population, NATO and the European Union have today a combined population of

810 million²⁸, some 350 million (43%) of whom live in countries that are members of both organisations. By 2004, 427 million (or 53%) are expected to live in countries that are members of both NATO and the European Union.

In many respects, the difference between NATO and the EU is likely to soon boil down to essentially the United States, Canada and Turkey. By 2004 the European pillars of NATO and the EU are expected to see 424 million (or 76%) of their 555 million inhabitants living in countries that are a member of both institutions. If Turkey is excluded from the picture, that percentage goes up to a staggering 87%.

More and more, the European pillar of NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy (however it may be ultimately defined) will be two sides of the same coin. That will, over time, require not only a meaningful division of labour, but organic change in both institutions permitting close cooperation. The most powerful motor driving this process is likely to be the need to pool both organisations' respective abilities to provide answers to the security problems of a growing Euro-Atlantic zone of integration and stability.

The European Union is, in theory, the institution that has a better hand.

The Union is holding out to the young democracies of the former East the most important promise of all: economic growth and prosperity. Historically speaking, adhesion to the EU gave countries a boost in economic growth of some 1.8% per year²⁹. The Union has set aside a treasure chest of some 40 billion Euro to smoothen the adhesion of the new members in 2004. Many of the financial subsidies the Union is handing out to its weaker members and regions will, after enlargement, move from Europe's South to the new members. This is a hefty incentive for countries with fragile economies and volatile electorates.

The Union has a second trump card, which will in the long term be even more important: It embodies, ultimately, the vision of a full political integration. That vision may, in Western Europe, be subject to considerable debate – idealistic hopes and visions clashing rather harshly with downright scepticism and renewed national perspectives; for the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, that perspective is

²⁸ All population figures in this and the next paragraph from *The Military Balance 2000-2001*, IISS, London, 2001.

²⁹ Thomas Fuller, *op.cit.* IHT 13.6.02, p. 1.

decisive. Having found themselves already once on the wrong side of an Iron Curtain dividing Europe, they simply cannot afford to be once more left out. Whatever the Union will look like, they will want to be part of it.

Finally, the European Union is truly covering it all; its mandate, enshrined in an ever-growing *acquis communautaire*, ranges from the Common Agricultural Policy to education, from technology to industrial standards, from air transport to space, from the European courts to Dublin, Schengen, Sevilla, and the vision of a common defence policy. There is not a single problem of former Eastern Europe for which the European Union would, *in principle*, not have an answer. But the italics are of relevance. The Union remains, in real life, still hard pressed to live up to its own objectives.

In military matters, the EU remains heavily dependent on NATO – and ultimately in crucial areas (such as air transport, intelligence, space-based systems and the ability to bring to bear massive firepower) simply on the US.

Moreover, unlike NATO (with Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the Membership Action Plan), the European Union has no policy, no strategy and no instrument to structure its security policy relationship with neighbours, candidates and aspiring members. There is, so far, no “ESDP PfP” – in spite of the fact that such a construct might become indispensable once the Union takes over responsibility for peace support missions, and in spite of the obvious political desirability of such an approach in view of the Union’s final aim of a common defence policy. That deficiency will, over time, have to be overcome – requiring quite obviously close coordination with Partnership for Peace.

After the dissolution of the WEU’s Parliamentary Assembly there is no European parliament left that can – as does NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly – address such issues as the democratic control of armed forces and security sector reform. Even the question of what powers should under ESDP be shifted to the European Parliament and which ones should remain the privilege of national parliaments is only now the subject of first studies.

Even in areas where one would instinctively expect the European Union to be very strong, surprisingly much exists so far only on paper. That includes the setting of *international* standards – providing clear guidelines not only for members, but also for

candidate countries and would-be candidates – for both border guards (to render Schengen more effective) and police forces (to better cope with organised international crime). In these crucial areas, EU training and assistance programmes remain eclectic. There are no international training sites or academies planned so far³⁰.

The European Union, in short, still resembles a huge building site: the view is impressive, work is going on everywhere, the investment in talent, vision, and money is significant; but do not expect the bathroom on the ground floor to be working yet or the rooms on the second floor to have a ceiling.

That Union is today reaching, however, a turning point by taking over security sector mandates outside its borders. The international police mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina went from the UN not, as one might have expected in the past, to the OSCE, but straight to the Union. With “Amber Fox” there might follow, in Macedonia, the first EU peace support mission. The list is bound to grow longer and – with the United States increasingly unwilling to tie down its armed forces in peace missions in Europe – might do so much more swiftly than the Union is developing its corresponding ability to respond.

It is, therefore, not surprising to see that both at the political level and on the ground NATO and the European Union work, in many crisis hot spots, ever more closely together. Obvious examples are the close partnership between Javier Solana and Lord Robertson in Belgrade, Skopje and Sarajevo or the strong informal working relations between the local representatives of NATO, the European Union, and the OSCE in many transition countries.

More can, and must, be done.

NATO will have to finally break out from the limited defence realm into the much broader, and relevant, world of security sector reform. It has been aware of that necessity for quite some time. The Swiss government has put the issue this spring fairly and squarely on the table by proposing to include in the future “Partnership Work Programme” (the catalogue that defines and contains the areas of cooperation

³⁰ Though there are a number of most encouraging multilateral initiatives, notably the *Mittel-europäische Polizei-Akademie (MEPA)* in Vienna (initiated by Austria) and the US (FBI) sponsored International Law Enforcement Academy, also in Budapest.

between Partnership for Peace countries), a new chapter on security sector reform. If adopted, that proposal would transform reality in a crucial point: PfP – and hence implicitly also NATO – nations would no longer restrict their dialogue to Foreign and Defence Ministries, but might enlarge that dialogue to include also Ministries of Justice, Interior and the Police. The move is urgent – not only in view of the real security policy challenges Europe is facing, but also in the light of the new realities created by 9/11 and NATO's subsequent invocation of Article V.

After protracted hesitation on what role to assign to Partnership for Peace after NATO enlargement, Washington seems to be inclined to suggest in November in Prague that PfP might be used as a tool to project stability to Central Asia and the Caucasus region. A glance at a map (and the political agenda) will suffice to see that the list must also include the successor countries to former Yugoslavia (three of which are actually MAP countries, while the rest aspire for membership in PfP). Yet the overall thrust of the US proposals for PfP is in the right direction, namely of the vision of a Euro-Atlantic integration zone that purposefully projects stability into neighbouring, still-unruly regions. If NATO should decide on such a course, the transition from defence to security sector thinking is, however, indispensable – for the problems of those crisis regions are not primarily military, but of a much broader nature.

That will imply that the approach is no longer defined in terms of improving simply those countries' military and defence capabilities, but their overall ability to cope with a multitude of risks and challenges. The United States and NATO have, perhaps inadvertently but no less effectively, already made that transition by linking Belgrade's accession to Partnership for Peace to a set of conditions that are essentially political in their nature and aim at demonstrating Yugoslavia's willingness to step out of the shadows of Milosevic and his regime. The new approach will also imply a move away from a case-by-case approach – implicit in NATO's current philosophy to judge each candidate on its own merits against a list of, not exclusively but mainly, military performance objectives – towards a regional vision of things. Thus, in former Yugoslavia, a purely military approach (as is still essentially embedded today in NATO's MAP) is bound to prove counter-productive. It is, indeed, far from clear whether for instance the development of professional and well-equipped armed forces of any of the former warring parties would truly increase security in the region – and not provoke a renewal of tensions and conflict – if the neighbours cannot match that progress.

Yet once the transition to a regional and broader vision that encompasses all aspects of the security sector is made, many things would fall into place.

NATO would be encouraged to create the necessary institutional bodies and programmes – thus rendering cooperation with the European Union even more compelling. Often it would be enough to give a slightly broader mandate to existing institutions to move significantly ahead.

One example is the “PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes”. The Consortium was launched in October 1998 in Zurich on a joint US-German-Swiss initiative. The Consortium brings together in its working groups and at its annual conference several hundred of the leading military and civilian think-tanks and educational institutions of the Euro-Atlantic region. After a most encouraging start, it has gradually been losing its focus somewhat during the last two years. Academic debate threatened to replace visionary thinking. The Consortium is well aware of these problems and actively and intelligently seeking to overcome them. If the invitation to the gathering were broadened to include all the other relevant security sector players – from police and border guards to the relevant parliamentary committees – the Euro-Atlantic world could, at almost no additional cost, create overnight a fascinating platform for discussing the broad security challenges and realities of the 21st century in an open-ended, non-rigid, and yet comprehensive forum. For, surprising as it may sound, such a comprehensive debate is so far conducted nowhere – each stratum of the security community preferring still to meet among its own members. The Consortium could, through a reshaped working group concept, forge a tool that would launch a multidisciplinary debate among relevant experts for shaping integrated answers to many of the questions posed by the new security agenda of the broadening Euro-Atlantic region – from the Balkans to the “War on Terrorism”. It hardly need be added that such a tool might play an important role in providing the nations of former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus and Central Asia with specific insight, information, and tutoring on their road to transforming their security sectors into balanced, lean and effective instruments. The Consortium, thus transformed, would serve both as a breeding ground for new ideas and concepts across institutional boundaries and as an instrument for providing tailor-made contributions to the reform and democratic controlling of the security sector in key countries.

Another option would be to shape, within the framework of the PfP “Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism” to be adopted at the Prague summit, new tools that deal comprehensively with the security sector. Thus it would make sense to create, along the lines of the standardised PfP exercise series “Cooperative Determination” and “Viking”, a special anti-terror PfP exercise module which could integrate not only the military, but the entire security sector. The exercise module could then be offered all interested partner nations. It is obvious that it might make sense to include in such a venture also the relevant offices of the EU.

In order to cope with the new and different security challenges we face, the already existing close *de facto* political coordination between NATO and the European Union must evolve towards a new form of burden sharing³¹ – leading in security matters to a joint “Euro-Atlantic *acquis communautaire*” shared both by NATO and the Union, and a new division of labour that includes also the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the International Financial Institutions.

The small group of criminal fanatics who on 11 September 2001, through their shocking willingness to use bestial violence, succeeded in gaining control of four aircraft and transformed them into *kamikaze* bombs that killed thousands of innocent victims, have rendered such a rethink compulsory.

Security Sector Reform and International Order

11 September 2001 was one of those rare events that were immediately perceived by many, if not most, observers as a defining moment in history. Such political watersheds do not imply that everything has actually changed overnight. Much stayed the way it had been before. But such events imply that several parameters of international relations were indeed profoundly altered and that these parameters were perceived to be of relevance. It does, moreover, imply that each single aspect of international relations had after “9/11” to be carefully analysed to see whether it had changed or not. That task is far from being completed. The aftershocks and ripple effects of 9/11 continue. The final balance sheet of what has changed and what is simply an extrapolation of previous trends is not yet in.

The most significantly affected country was, obviously, the United States – its outlook and vision with respect to the rest of the world, its domestic policies, its self-understanding. There was an immediate expectation³² – around the world – that the US would after this nightmare ask but one simple question: who is on our side? There was the expectation that Washington would not easily tolerate equivocal answers to that question – but be prepared to go, if necessary, her own way.

In many respects that is precisely what has happened.

Yet reality is always more complex. There were the pictures of the apocalypse that had hit the United States that went around the world – the incredible sight of passenger aircraft, full of innocent people, being crashed into the towers and condemning there thousands more to die, the almost obscene impressiveness of the World Trade Centre collapsing in what looked like slow motion, later the unbearably serenity of “Ground Zero”. Nobody could or would escape the emotional impact of these scenes. The United States, consequently, was assured of an unprecedented outpouring of international support – from NATO invoking Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty to Russia providing active assistance in preparing the ground for the later Afghanistan campaign. The world has, in the aftermath of 11 September, held its breath – and was, perhaps still is, ready to follow the US lead in responding to this outrage.

Whether 9/11 has been, in the end, just a disaster – the wanton murder of thousands of innocents by some fanatics – or a turning point crystallising issues and enabling the international community to better cope, with renewed energy, with the new risks, threats and challenges of our times, depends on the wisdom and farsightedness of the lessons we draw from it.

There are two sets of issues that need to be addressed: the necessary response to this new type of threat, and the implications of the decline in international order that form the background to the attack.

The United States was profoundly shocked by 9/11. For most Americans their Republic is the shining symbol of freedom, liberty and democracy. That “City on the

³¹ Cf. Javier Solana, *La défense de l'ordre mondial passe par la coopération et le respect des règles*, Le Temps, 13 September 2002, p. 11.

³² Cf. deliberations at IISS Annual Conference in Geneva, opening on 12 September 2001.

Hill” was all of a sudden attacked, if not besieged, by vicious forces of evil. The US reaction was, not surprisingly, not only one of self-defence, but also of profound outrage. Both reactions have given rise to complex questions.

The military response, when first delivered in Afghanistan, proved again that the United States is in military matters by now in a class of its own. The “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) is propelling the US armed forces (and them alone) into a new age. That revolution is no longer driven only, or even primarily, by military research, but by the revolution in civilian technology. What can be bought today from the shelves of Silicon Valley is in most (though not all) cases much more modern and efficient than what dedicated military research is painstakingly producing. The turnover in private IT inventories, where PCs are replaced on average every two-three years, is today much swifter than that of major weapons systems and platforms (the radar of the US Aegis cruisers is 1970s vintage). US project efforts (such as “The Army after Next” or the review process initiated by the new Bush Administration early in its term) not only experiment with new weapons systems (unmanned air combat vehicles instead of fighters, missile platform ships, resembling somewhat CSS *Virginia*, instead of aircraft carriers) and transform traditional military thinking (what future for highly sophisticated weapon systems like main battle tanks, if their only enemy – other battle tanks – are dying out?), but are by their ability to build and operate an integrated system of systems light-years ahead of what is going on in the rest of the world. With swift progress in bio-engineering, nanotechnology, robotics and artificial intelligence, even more fundamental technological change is in the offing, which is likely to further accentuate the US lead³³.

The US military lead is, however, not only one of quality, but also of quantity. The *supplementary increase* in the US defence budget and related security outlays voted after 9/11 were larger than the *combined* total defence outlays of the key European NATO allies.

US irritation with respect to what is perceived as a European unwillingness to increase defence spending has consequently grown further and given a new dimension to the age old Trans-Atlantic debate about burden-sharing.

³³ It can be argued that the increasing complexity and swiftness of revolutionary technological change renders the parliamentary and democratic control of armed forces in general and R&D decisions in particular even more difficult.

Yet, the debate starts from a series of wrong premises.

First, what the US complains about should not be the quantity, but the quality of the defence efforts of their European allies. In truth, Europe is full of soldiers³⁴ who simply lack a mission. Few of them are professionals who can be deployed quickly to face any sort of contingency. Hardly any of them are interoperable with US forces on an equal footing³⁵. Heavy equipment still dominates many arsenals – from main battle tanks to self-propelled artillery. Deep in her heart, the US simply does not believe any longer that the Europeans – perhaps with the exception of the United Kingdom – can militarily still be taken seriously. The genuine issue is thus not – and definitely not only – insufficient defence expenditure, but primarily that of defence money wrongly spent, not outlays, but output.

Secondly, the “War against Terrorism” is not a “war” in the traditional sense, but rather a protracted police and intelligence operation of truly global dimensions. Afghanistan is likely to remain the exception, not the rule. The case made in Washington against Iraq is not that of a smoking gun that irrefutably points at Baghdad being an accomplice of Osama Bin-Laden³⁶, but that of unfinished business and the unease that the perspective of a Saddam Hussein equipped with weapons of mass destruction evokes. We are indeed confronted no longer with the risk of traditional conventional war³⁷, but with asymmetrical threats. The significance of these more complex threats is recognised by the United States. The Bush Administration has, consequently, defined a new national security strategy in which pre-emptive strike against such threats, which cannot be contained or deterred, plays an important role. Simultaneously, the new situation has prompted both the new Homeland Defence efforts and a significant increase in the budgets not only of the military, but also of the intelligence and federal police apparatuses³⁸.

³⁴ In 1999 2.7 million – compared with some 1.37 million for the US, cf. *The Military Balance 2000-2001*, IISS, London, p. 297.

³⁵ One may argue that the US should expect from a functioning alliance a relatively small, but highly trained and well-equipped number of troops able to cooperate with US forces in even the most demanding of missions (“Battle Force”), a somewhat larger contingent of troops able to be involved in mopping up operations and to sustain operations of the main battle forces, providing specialised, rare skills, and finally troops trained in peace support missions that are able to release US forces from such tasks. Cf. in this context also Thomas Frisch, *Militärische Spezialkräfte für die Europäische Union*, SWP-Studie No 13, Berlin. April 2002.

³⁶ The CNN tapes actually show an Osama Bin-Laden strongly critical of Saddam Hussein.

³⁷ One may argue that the number of potential conflicts along classical lines is today shrinking to less than half a dozen scenarios: The two Koreas, China and Taiwan, India and Pakistan, the Gulf region.

³⁸ Cf. Jonathan Stevenson, *Countering Terrorism at Home: US and European Experiences*, in *The Implications of 11 September: A Year On*, IISS and DCAF, September 2002.

Against this background, Trans-Atlantic burden-sharing in the fight against Al Qaeda and similar threats should be looked at in a much broader sense. Europe's soft security contributions – from peace support operations in South Eastern Europe and beyond, to institutions and capacity-building programmes (including internal security forces, border guards, and the judiciary), to other forms of stability projection, up to the costs of NATO and EU enlargement – are a crucial part of the Trans-Atlantic efforts to manage peaceful change and to cope with new risks and challenges. Where the threat is increasingly asymmetrical, the relative importance of soft security programmes must grow.

The burden-sharing debate should, thus, focus rather on whether Europe does enough in this soft area or not, whether the various responses on the two sides of the Atlantic are well enough coordinated to be truly called common, and whether there is not also in the soft security sector an urgent need to look not only for “common”, but indeed “joint” responses.

The financial package being prepared for EU enlargement is, on closer inspection, indeed far from impressive: 40 billion Euro for the first three years of enlargement (or 0.08% of the EU's GDP). That sum will shrink to perhaps no more than 25 billion Euro, if expected inverse payments of the new members to various EU funds and programmes are deducted from it. In comparison, the US Marshall Plan was, in relative terms, 15 times larger and the Federal Republic of Germany spent, after reunification, a staggering trillion DM in the former GDR³⁹.

In the area of coordination the need for both NATO and the European Union to develop institutions that complement each other in order to cope with the new type of security challenges has already been highlighted. To invoke Article V is one thing, to give that step practical – as opposed to political and emotional – significance is another.

The time could be ripe to strengthen the Trans-Atlantic relationship through a new Atlantic Charter. Such a document should aim at four objectives: (1) to demonstrate cohesion and unity in the face of a new threat; (2) to state the principles on which the common front towards the new challenge should be based; (3) to set clear institutional signals on how to cope practically with the problem – and how to

³⁹ All figures in this paragraph from Thomas Fuller, *The Next Europe: At What Price a Bigger EU?*, IHT, 13 June, 2001.

guarantee peace and stability in the growing Euro-Atlantic region; (4) most important of all, to reconfirm a community of common values in the face of a foe who is cynically disregarding the individual and the human being. Such a Charter might be opened for others to adhere to – in the short term notably Russia and Ukraine, in a longer perspective every nation willing to shoulder part of the burden of strengthening the Euro-Atlantic zone of peace, stability and integration.

The need to base the response of the Euro-Atlantic region on the reconfirmation of a common set of values is urgent. For the pendulum is, and not only in the US, swinging away from the protection of the rights of the individual towards the protection of the safety of the community. That is inevitable after 9/11. The need was reinforced by the recent discovery by CNN of a virtual library of videos done for Osama Bin-Laden. The tapes included detailed instructions for sleepers and a new generation of terrorists, as well as irrefutable proof of experiments with weapons of mass destruction. The discovery is particularly worrisome because people like Bin-Laden have objectives, but do not put forward specific demands that can be met⁴⁰. Clausewitz does not apply to them. Deterrence does not work. If they are not stopped, they will simply continue. Similarly, terrorism not being an ideology but a specific form of using violence, there can never be a “victory”⁴¹ – only the building of a global consensus against the blind use of violence against innocents.

Yet, if the swing of the pendulum is not accompanied, and balanced, through a corresponding increase in democratic oversight over the security sector, we are all bound to lose. International legal standards, the rule of law, international humanitarian law, and human rights cannot be permitted to be among the first victims of terrorism – or we risk winning a battle while losing the war. The US opposition to the International Criminal Court is overshadowing the progress made with another court at The Hague⁴². Justice can never be partial. The law can never be permitted to

⁴⁰ Eppler, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁴¹ Eppler, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-21.

⁴² The US diplomatic and political moves to get legally-binding pledges that US citizens will not be extradited to the ICC are also troubling in other respects. First, the link that was made with the UN peacekeeping mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and, implicitly, all other such UN missions) threatens to seriously undercut much of the progress made by the UN in recent years. Similarly, the current US attempts to break up the common position of the EU on the issue may prove in the longer term to be counter-productive. The US has to gain more from a strong Europe able to pull its weight internationally than from a hard-won guarantee against a contingency, which is extremely unlikely in the first place. Finally the attempt to ask EU and NATO candidate countries to take a different position from that of the EU on this issue is not helpful either and threatens to render NATO's and the EU's decision-making processes even more complicated in the future. Cf. on this set of issues: Norbert Eitelhuber, *UN-Friedenssicherung zwischen den Fronten. Der Streit um den Internationalen Strafgerichtshof*, SWP-

make distinctions between gender, race, wealth or nationality. The notion of military courts and the pictures from Guantanamo are thus deeply troubling. *Particularly* in the fight against terrorism and barbarism, the ends do not justify all means, if we do not want to jeopardise, and eventually lose, the very core of our value-system: democracy, justice and human dignity⁴³. For how could we otherwise convince the young democracies of what used to be Eastern Europe and the successor states to the former Soviet Union to move forward in their difficult transition towards democracy and the rule of law? How could we ever hope to project stability into the crisis hot spots bordering the enlarging Euro-Atlantic region? How could we maintain the moral high ground indispensable for forging a genuinely global coalition, and strategy, against terror?⁴⁴

Such a global strategy cannot ignore the cradles of violence: religious extremism, the deep frustration (and sense of humiliation) of the Arab and Muslim world due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the demographic explosion in large parts of the developing world that renders all too often economic growth meaningless (and thus cements the way to poverty and hunger), and – perhaps the most dangerous phenomenon of the last decade – the growing number of failed or faltering states, where everything and everybody is up for grabs.

Even modern terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda (that are run by well- educated, rich criminals⁴⁵, a kind of fundamentalist aberration of the criminal figures that normally populate James Bond movies, who do not even overlook the cynical possibility of making a little “side benefit” on the stock market from their “insider knowledge” of when and where the next attack will take place) need safe havens and logistical bases. Such bases may be offered, for political reasons, by dictators and extremist governments; they risk spreading like cancer if international order should simply collapse in an ever-growing number of “failed” states.

Aktuell, No 27, August 2002, 8 p. and *Die USA handeln konsequent, aber ohne Weitsicht*, NZZ, 1 September, 2002, p. 19.

⁴³ Cf. on this issue also Charles Lane, *Has Bush Infringed the Constitution? The Debate Heats Up*, IHT, 3 September, 2002, pp. 1 and 8.

⁴⁴ That thought also implies that we should not permit every dictator to call his fight against his internal opposition a contribution to the war against terrorism. Similarly, we should refrain from embracing every regime as an ally that is willing to kill some “terrorists”. The hard historical lessons of the US having once supported – for what seemed at the time perfectly good reasons – the Taliban against the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan, and Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran, should not be forgotten. Many of today’s disasters are what remained from the good ideas of yesterday.

⁴⁵ Cf. Colum Lynch, *Bid to Stop Funds for Qaeda Hits Obstacles*, IHT, 29 August, 2002, pp. 1 and 4.

The situation in the developing world is indeed grim. The continuous privatisation and fragmentation of security is a trend in many countries of the Third World. We are confronted, in an increasing number of countries, no longer by traditional insurgencies that either aim at toppling the government or at segregation, but with warlords reminiscent of the Thirty Years War⁴⁶. Their objectives are not ideological. Their roots may be tribal or ethnic, but not necessarily so. Their activities are focused on the ability to plunder and to deal in easily marketable commodities – gold, tropical wood, diamonds, arms, drugs and human beings (notably women, illegal immigrants and children).

According to the UNDP there are some 550 million small arms circulating in the world today⁴⁷. Only 41% of them are in the hands of regular armed forces⁴⁸, while over 300 million are probably in private hands⁴⁹. The number of child soldiers is estimated worldwide at close to 300,000⁵⁰, affecting 36 countries⁵¹. The number of insurgents, armed gangs and other non-state combatants is in many crisis regions staggering – and often one of the only surviving “career opportunities”. Thus, estimates for Sub-Saharan Africa alone range in the neighbourhood of 200,000.⁵² The brutality of conflict is increasing in such a context. The horror of Sierra Leone, where armed gangs cut off – not in a rampant outburst of uncontrolled (and later perhaps regretted) violence, but purposefully, in cold blood, repeatedly, and on a large scale – children’s limbs in order to increase the humanitarian burden on the other side, is but one example for this return to downright barbarism. The UNDP estimates that in the 53 conflicts of the 1990s some 3.6 million people died – mostly civilians⁵³. If in the First World War the ratio of military to civilian casualties was 10:1, that ratio has by now been reversed to 1:10 – thus multiplying the proportion of civilian victims of conflict in a single century by a factor of 100⁵⁴. The number of victims, again mostly civilian, continues to grow even when the guns fall silent: some 90 countries around

⁴⁶ Eppler, speech delivered at the annual conference of Swiss ambassadors, Berne, 21 August, 2002; cf. also François Heisbourg, *Hyperterrorism: la nouvelle guerre*, éditions Odile Jacob, Paris, October 2001, pp. 201-207.

⁴⁷ UNDP, Human Development Report 2002, New York, 2002, p. 97.

⁴⁸ Eppler, *op.cit.*, p. 76.

⁴⁹ Keith Krause (Programme Director), *Small Arms Survey 2001*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 86.

⁵⁰ Figure provided by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, cf. on the issue also Guy Goodwin-Gill, Ilene Cohn, *Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflicts*, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1994.

⁵¹ Human Rights Watch (<http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/index.htm>)

⁵² *Small Arms Survey 2001*, *op.cit.*, p. 79.

⁵³ Human Development Report 2002, *op.cit.*, p. 85.

⁵⁴ Eppler, *op.cit.*, p. 60.

the world are today affected by landmines, booby traps, and unexploded ordnance – causing anywhere between 15,000 and 20,000 mine victims each year⁵⁵.

Where there is no security, there will be no development. In failed or faltering states, crime and conflict become the only trade, humanitarian aid the only means for a suffering population to survive⁵⁶.

Where there is no development, there will be no democracy and no economic perspective, no end to hunger, poverty and despair, no human dignity, progress, and social development – but only a deadly breeding ground for even more violence, extremism, terror, dictatorship and conflict.

The consequences will be dreadful. UNDP estimates in its latest “Human Development Report” that during the 20th century “deaths by governments” (caused either through direct violence or gross negligence in disasters⁵⁷) amounted to no less than 170 million people. The overwhelming majority perished under authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. The number of victims of this “democide”, as UNDP calls it, far outstrips those of all military conflicts – in spite of the fact that the 20th century has also in this respect set a tragic new record.

In short, the international community must shed many of its idealistic and cosily comforting visions. The 19th century picture of the “noble savage” was as much a product of colonialism as the Gatling gun and the ivory trade. Just as absurd is the pleasant notion that disrupted societies in today’s Third World will – if just left to their traditions, happy relationship with nature, and old societal as well as tribal structures and instincts – move by themselves towards a bright future with perfect gender respect and a deep understanding of the profound harmony between humans and nature from which everybody else could just learn. The brutal reality is that that dream of an innocent, harmonious society close to nature is slaughtered, every day, by bursts from Kalashnikov rifles, mutilating slashes from machetes, and the most devastating degrading of human beings.

⁵⁵ Human Development Report 2002, *op.cit.*, p. 97, cf. on this issue also Ilaria Bottigliero, *120 Million Landmines Deployed Worldwide: Fact or Fiction?*, Fondation Pro Victimis, Geneva, 2000.

⁵⁶ It is particularly worrisome that an increasing number of countries are not only dependent on development assistance, but indeed on humanitarian assistance.

⁵⁷ Ukraine's population losses to the great hunger of the early 1930s alone are estimated at 6 million people.

Control of the armed elements of society is *the* paramount issue for what are euphemistically called (in superbly post-colonial and school-masterly language) “failed states” where, as a result of a total fragmentation of power, people are butchered by the millions – most of the time without CNN being present and thus with nobody caring, let alone crying out in outrage.

This is still the issue in countries rarely accused of much, which just happen to be a little bit authoritarian (if not perhaps just a *twist* totalitarian, if we are to be honest) where democracy and human rights exist on paper, but are regularly ignored by a security apparatus that is, when everything is said and done, not only above the law, running large business enterprises, and quite willing to assure itself respect through measures not necessarily foreseen in the Constitution – such as “death squads”, paramilitary butchers to do the dirty work⁵⁸, and the “occasional” coup.

It is still the issue, no less, in countries held hostage to so-called guerrilla or national liberation movements that have long ceased to remember the ideals or visions that, perhaps, once gave them birth and legitimacy, and have long since become simple criminal organisations dealing as easily in human beings, drugs, and other sellable commodities as in violence.

It is still the issue in former dictatorships – communist or other – where fragile democracies, led by all too human beings, susceptible to being lured into deals for political reasons, if not simple financial profit, are overshadowed by the continued existence of non-transparent power structures from the old regime.

It is still the issue even in the Euro-Atlantic region, in our ability to see the adaptation and continuous reform of our security structures as a necessarily permanent process driven by the need to provide a response not to the questions of the past, but to the challenges of the future. Most importantly of all, the issue boils down to the simple question of whether our security structures truly serve one single objective, namely to be a tool tailored to serve and protect the people, run in a transparent way, democratically controlled, and therefore in a responsible way.

The United States has become the world’s last superpower. Yet that outcome may ultimately have had less to do with the number of US nuclear warheads or aircraft

⁵⁸ The Arkans of this world that we find with sad regularity everywhere from the Balkans to East Timor and whose organisations seem to have escaped a macho zoo (“Tigers”, “Lions”, “Eagles”).

carriers than with a simple, down-to-earth objective the Founding Fathers inserted as a guiding principle in the US Constitution – the idea that the ultimate objective of a country and its institutions should be to create such conditions as to permit its inhabitants the pursuit of happiness. That objective remains, more than two centuries later, not a bad political and moral recipe –at a global level too.

The democratic control and continuous reform of the security sector is a key prerequisite for reaching that goal.

Managing Change

The world has entered a period of profound and in all probability escalating change – and uncertain outcome. We have entered uncharted waters. At the time of writing, it seems likely that our times will one day be called in history books the age of globalisation. We have entered that area, so far, only partly and definitely clumsily – and perhaps with the wrong priorities and visions. Yet history – the sum of life – is, as life itself, irreversible. We are where we are.

We are today confronted, at the global level, by three obvious challenges: (1) to feed the still-growing population of our planet; (2) to balance the necessary economic growth with the demands of respecting (more aptly perhaps: of restoring) our environment; (3) to protect mankind from the nightmare of increasingly fragmented, if not collapsing, security structures.

The notion of “sustained development” has, if we want to cope with that reality, not only to encompass the balance between growth and environment, but also to include the security sector.

The notions of “security sector reform” and of the democratic control of the security sector had their roots in the debate on how to assure good governance. They have, by now, stepped out of the shadow of that debate and become recognised as key topics in their own right.

This is an important step.

It is also a politically significant step. There have been many voices predicting the gradual decline of the state – and there are indeed many easily observable trends that slash the credibility of the notion of state sovereignty down to its bare bones: the integrated world economy and interdependent global markets, the all-too-visible effects of climatic change catastrophically affecting “spaceship Earth”, the multiple requirements of the human race's growing mobility, new diseases, international crime and terrorism.

And yet: the number of those who argue that the role of the state might not be doomed, but actually gain in importance, has more recently been growing again⁵⁹.

If we look at the declining number of international conflicts of the classical type and the simultaneously increasing number of countries, mostly – but not only – in the developing world, that are victims of internal conflicts, there is a solid argument to be made that the problem might be that we have no longer too much state, but too little. More and more, conflict and war are indeed no longer caused by the traditional predatory instincts and expansionist ambitions of states, but by a new source of violence, symbolised by ethnic and/or religious strife and the result of a creeping fragmentation of the state monopoly of legitimate force.

If the US campaign against the long-outcast⁶⁰ Taliban regime has proved anything, it is the danger of blissfully ignoring the deep long-term risks and threats to international order posed by “failed” or faltering states. Such *de facto* vacua will, inevitably, soon turn into safe havens for organised international crime (from drug-trafficking to every other vice), into harbingers of terror – and, perhaps most terrible of all, into a living nightmare for their inhabitants, particularly women and children.

Similarly, the creeping loss of the state monopoly of force we witness today will imply that, step by step, ever larger swathes of our planet will fall victim to eternalised conflict that can no longer be terminated. Once the state monopoly of force is lost, the ability to conclude peace is lost at the same time⁶¹. That very situation prevails in the Arab-Israeli conflict (which cannot be solved, if Arafat is not able to control organisations like Hamas, and if Sharon cannot offer, even in theory, a full withdrawal from all occupied territories as the price of peace – because of the armed Israeli

⁵⁹ Cf. Speech of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan at the occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the Geneva Graduate Institute for International Affairs, 7 June, 2002.

⁶⁰ The Taliban were recognised by just three out of 189 UN members.

settlers). It is then often a short step to the almost insoluble problem of eternalised war – in which war (and most often the plunder and rape associated with it) becomes the fundamental objective in itself. We meet the same problem in Southern Sudan, in the Caucasus (notably in Chechnya⁶²) or in Colombia.

There are some who argue that, if sovereignty is lost at home, it cannot be claimed either at the international level⁶³. Such countries should, that line of reasoning goes on, become legitimate targets of international intervention⁶⁴, at least be taken over in some way by the United Nations – perhaps under a revised “Trusteeship Council” scheme. Those proposals are highly idealistic – and will not work. Nobody is willing to send a peace-building force of sufficient strength to the heart of Africa, to Somalia or any similar region, to keep it there long enough to restore the nucleus of a working state, and to accept the inevitable losses. One “Black Hawk Down” was one too many. There is no point in reviving colonialism in a new form – and there is no hope that the inherently idealist generation of ’68 will be willing to permit peace-keeping operations to resemble a new Vietnam War.

Yet the problem of failed states, of large swathes of territory ruled by armed gangs and organised crime, exists – not only in Africa, but also in parts of South Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Central and some parts of South-East Asia.

How do we cope with this new challenge? How do we deal not only with the Osama Bin-Ladens of this world, but also with the Abu Sayyaf, the FRAC, the warlords of Western Africa, the Congo and the Horn of Africa?

There is in the Euro-Atlantic region at least an answer to this 64,000-dollar question. The attraction of the Euro-Atlantic integration process is indeed a powerful tool to make countries – and perhaps more important – societies willing to accept even profound change. It opens the vision of the reintegration of a fragmented society and war-torn region into the broader concept of a Europe growing together. Countries like Yugoslavia or Bosnia and Herzegovina are indeed willing to pay a concrete political price for that vision, and to embark on genuine political change in order to join Europe’s institutions. Integration into a larger community of values, wealth, and

⁶¹ Eppler, *op.cit.*, pp. 46-47.

⁶² Cf. Florian Hassel, *Wie im Dreissigjährigen Krieg*, in *Der Bund*, 24 August 2002, p. 5.

⁶³ Eppler, Speech delivered at the annual conference of Swiss ambassadors, Berne, 21 August 2002.

⁶⁴ Eppler, *ditto*.

security is, undoubtedly, a powerful, perhaps the only, alternative to state sovereignty and a mighty motor for change.

To respond to that vision, Europe will, over time, no longer be able to simply accept, with a slightly amused – and at the same time disinterested - shrug of the shoulders, what is jokingly called in the jargon “the alphabet soup”.

If NATO and the European Union in the narrow, the OSCE and Council of Europe in the wider sense, start to overlap territorially, the question cannot be avoided any longer as to how these organisations relate to, and cooperate with, each other – let alone the question of how they interact with the United Nations.

A common denominator of all these institutions is their ability to significantly contribute to the democratic control and reform of the security sector. The United Nations has the deepest legitimacy – yet also the weakest mandate. The European Union brings to that enterprise the broadest mandate (and ultimately the most impressive inventory), but also the most cumbersome bureaucracy. NATO carries the greatest experience and expertise, the leanest structures, and a pronounced Anglo-Saxon pragmatism. The OSCE still offers the largest membership, great experience in security-relevant norm building⁶⁵ and confidence-building measures⁶⁶, as well as a superb network of highly professional missions on the ground. The Council of Europe, finally, is well ahead in the area of strengthening the rule of law and democracy – as well as a major actor in developing police ethics and fighting corruption⁶⁷.

There are, moreover, the World Bank and the other International Financial Institutions. They are increasingly aware of the intrinsic link between security and development⁶⁸, but prevented by caution – or their statutes – from entering the debate on security sector control and reform.

On the ground, all of these organisations work closely together through a dense network of local representatives and have jointly a profound insight into what could – and should – be done. What is lacking is an integration of these efforts into a joint

⁶⁵ OSCE Code of Conduct.

⁶⁶ From the work done at Stockholm Conference to the respective efforts of today's OSCE Mission in Belgrade.

⁶⁷ Council of Europe's Code of Police Ethics.

⁶⁸ Cf. for instance Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, *Regional Military Spillovers*, World Bank, 2001.

objective at the highest political level. Whether we like it or not: these Western institutions have, once their Eastern counterparts collapsed, been burdened with much broader responsibilities. It is not only recommendable, but indeed indispensable that they develop a joint vision and a meaningful division of labour.

But: what about Sierra Leone? What about countries that have ceased to function?

There is no simple answer to that question. The young and fragile democracies of what was once the Soviet empire have a powerful motive for change in the promises of European integration. Those incentives simply do not work in the Sierra Leones and Somalias of this world.

Clearly, military intervention cannot be the answer. The readiness of the international community to intervene for humanitarian purposes can, after the fiasco of the first intervention in Somalia, no longer be counted upon. But neither can neglect be an answer.

What is needed is assistance – but not blind assistance.

There is a growing consensus that the developing world will need, if it has to have a chance, more financial assistance. It is indeed sobering that the OECD countries spend today some 50 billion US dollars per year for development cooperation – and some 350 billion US dollars per year to support and protect their domestic agricultural markets⁶⁹. There is, in many countries, a willingness to increase development cooperation.

Unconditional assistance will, however, be only a drop on a hot stone and definitely not a long-term answer. There is much to be said for firmly establishing security sector reform as a *condition* for development cooperation (though not for humanitarian aid).

The corollary of such a move would have to be the willingness to offer, and finance, specifically tailored projects and programmes actually enabling countries and societies to move in that direction and to regain, step by step, the state monopoly of force. An important aspect will in that context be the ability to offer help for self-help.

⁶⁹ Figures from Seco, Berne, 2002.

It is, thus, crucial to provide – in Africa as much as in Eastern Europe – expertise on how other countries from the region – and of similar size, afflicted by similar problems – coped with those problems. It will be of equal importance to transfer lessons learned and experience gained from one region to another. Our vision must be to let the Southern hemisphere benefit from the lessons the Euro-Atlantic region has learned from the Cold War, from Partnership for Peace, from integration and in crisis management. And it will be crucial to look in this respect at the security sector as a whole.

It will be important to focus not only, as during the Cold War, primarily on armed forces, but to shift the analysis also to other security forces, such as intelligence and state security services, police and border guards, paramilitary forces and any other armed component of a country's reality. It will be crucial to include in any strategy a sustained dialogue with political parties, parliaments (and – above all – their respective committees), the media and civil society. The latter have, so far, indeed been grossly neglected as indispensable partners, in spreading knowledge about, and understanding of, the issues at stake – and thus in shaping a stable, functioning system of democratic control of the security sector.

To achieve results will not be easy – nor will it be cheap. Innovative thinking and integrated approaches will be needed.

Yet, there are some examples that may help to navigate those uncharted waters ahead. Thus, some foundations run by political parties – notably the German and American ones – have developed excellent programmes and much expertise. The United Kingdom has, under Prime Minister Tony Blair, taken the innovative and interesting step of merging funds from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Cooperation, and the Ministry of Defence – thus linking security sector reform and development cooperation into a joint strategic approach. Similarly, UNDP has recognised the intimate link between development and security – a step that may, over time, increase not only understanding of the complexity of the issue, but ultimately also increase international funding for integrated approaches, putting the requirements of security sector reform on an equal footing with the more traditional notions of development cooperation and the protection of the environment. And Switzerland has initiated the creation of the “Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces” dedicated to encouraging the reform and democratic control of the security sector.

These are steps in the right direction. But if we want to manage the change necessary to building a new international order that increases human security, around the globe, there is room both for additional initiatives and the urgent need for a better coordination between policy areas that have, so far, not been recognised as being intimately interrelated.

What is needed is, in analogy to NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and the PfP "Planning and Review Process" (PARP) some sort of a "Peace Capabilities Initiative", i.e. a comprehensive and coherent tool, based on a country's specific situation and objectives, covering the entire security sector, and aimed at providing countries in need over a reasonable period of time with the necessary instruments to regain, and then assure, the state monopoly of legitimate force. Like the DCI such a "PCI" should contain clearly defined objectives enabling progress or the lack of progress to be measured. It would facilitate – and focus – foreign assistance programmes – while at the same time offering a useful tool in the fight against terrorism. In our interdependent world it is no longer enough to be able to win a war; we must also master the much more demanding task of being able to gain peace.



Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Established in 2000 on the initiative of the Swiss government, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), encourages and supports States and non-State governed institutions in their efforts to strengthen democratic and civilian control of armed and security forces, and promotes international cooperation within this field, initially targeting the Euro-Atlantic regions.

The Centre collects information, undertakes research and engages in networking activities in order to identify problems, to establish lessons learned and to propose the best practices in the field of democratic control of armed forces and civil-military relations. The Centre provides its expertise and support to all interested parties, in particular governments, parliaments, military authorities, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, academic circles.

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Theodor H. Winkler, Managing Change: The Reform and Democratic Control of the Security Sector and International Order, Occasional Paper No. 1 (Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, DCAF, October 2002) 40. Google Scholar. 10. Dylan Hendrickson and Andrzej Karkoszka, "The challenges of security sector reform", in: SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 175-201. Google Scholar. 11. The term security sector reform (SSR) was first introduced in a 1998 speech by UK Secretary of State for International Development Clare Short.¹ Discourse on the need for a comprehensive and integrated approach to the security sector in development contexts had been ongoing since the early 1990s, but Short's speech and a number of Department for International Development - Ensuring that the size and structure of the security sector reflects financial realities as well as a threat analysis that takes into consideration human security needs. - Making decisions and setting priorities, within budgetary constraints. - Establishing systems of financial accountability consistent with the standards applied across the public service. Security sector reform (SSR) and democratisation are closely linked in both theory and practice. The high levels of volatility that characterise democratisation processes, therefore, have direct implications for SSR strategy. We identify possible scenarios for SSR in the context of democratic reversals by focussing on two observations about this relationship: first, limited progress in SSR is still possible under conditions of democratic reversal; and second, certain systematic features characterise how SSR stalls as a result of democratic reversals.² Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone and the Role of the Office of National Security. Jan 1997.³ Jackson and Albrecht (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, 2010). Recommended publications.